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Key points 
• Decarbonisation goes far beyond what is 
technologically or even economically feasible, 
to encompass a complexity of political, social 
and economic factors. 
• South Africa’s coal-dominated electricity 
sector, a key feature of the country’s minerals-
energy complex, is in crisis and subject to 
change. This offers potential opportunities for 
decarbonisation. 
• Despite positive examples of decarbonisation in 
South Africa’s electricity sector, such as a 
procurement programme for renewable energy, 
there are structural path dependencies around 
coal-fired generation and security of supply.  
• Decision-making in electricity is highly 
politicised. Lack of transparency and power 
struggles in the policy sphere are key challenges 
to decarbonisation. 
• There are battles over which technologies 
should be prioritised and which institutional 
arrangements should facilitate them.  
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Executive summary 
South Africa’s electricity landscape is undergoing rapid change. The state-owned monopoly 
utility Eskom, historically dependent on the country’s until recently low-cost coal supplies is 
now in financial and supply-side crisis, subject to growing indebtedness and downgraded to 
non-investment grade or ‘junk’ status. South Africa has gone from one of the world’s cheapest 
electricity generators in the early 2000s to a 270% increase in electricity tariffs by 2015, with 
further increases predicted in the future. Since late 2014 the country has experienced regular 
load-shedding, a symptom of a larger electricity supply shortage that began in 2007, and which 
is likely to continue for at least five to ten years. Meanwhile, a successful programme for the 
procurement of renewable energy from independent power producers (IPPs) has procured 6300 
MW since it was introduced in 2011, generating approximately 2% of total electricity at the 
time of writing in September 2015. Processes are also underway to procure independent power 
from other sources, including coal, cogeneration and gas, as well an embedded generation 
programme for rooftop solar photovoltaics (PV). A 9600 MW nuclear fleet is also currently 
under discussion and shale gas extraction is being explored, both of which are the subject of 
contested debate. 
South Africa’s coal-dependent electricity sector is responsible for 45% of national emissions 
(237 Mt CO2-equivalent in 2010). Coal-fired plants account for 85% of installed capacity and 
92% of electricity produced. Therefore decarbonisation in the electricity sector cannot be 
achieved without reducing the absolute contribution of coal-fired power at the same time as 
integrating a range of low-carbon energy supply options such as wind, solar photovoltaics (PV), 
nuclear and concentrating solar power (CSP) and new energy storage technologies. Demand-
side management measures such as energy efficiency and increased numbers of installed of 
solar water heaters are also significant options. Further, decarbonisation of the electricity sector 
has to involve the adaptation and restructuring of network infrastructures and accompanying 
institutions, markets and policy frameworks that in their current form are supporting a carbon-
intensive system of production and consumption. Finally, if decarbonisation is also to 
incorporate a ‘just transition’ to a lower-carbon economy, then it must also address questions of 
economic inequality and welfare and an inclusive and sustainable growth path. In South 
Africa’s case this is particularly challenging. As one of the most unequal countries in the world, 
the question of access to energy in South Africa is paralleled by its major development 
challenges. These challenges are linked to a history of racial oppression and inequality, poor 
access to services such as health and education, high levels of violence and an unemployment 
rate of around 25% (if discouraged work seekers are excluded) or 37% (when using the broader 
definition). 
Decarbonisation therefore goes far beyond what is technologically or even economically 
feasible, to encompass a complexity of political, social and economic factors. Choosing 
pathways that avoid long-term technological ‘lock-in’ whilst prioritising socio-economic well-
being and transparent and democratic policy processes is crucial to the realisation of 
decarbonisation. With this in mind, this paper provides an in-depth and historical analysis of the 
key features of South Africa’s electricity sector and the stakeholders and beneficiaries operating 
within it. This includes an exploration of the sector’s structure and governance; the success or 
lack thereof of key policy developments in creating accountable systems of decision-making 
and facilitating the introduction of renewable energy, particularly since the end of apartheid; and 
the role of key institutions and individuals in shaping and/or blocking such developments. Such 
an analysis is essential in order to understand how technologically feasible scenarios of 
decarbonisation are either blocked or supported by political and economic forces. We find that, 
while there are positive cases of decarbonisation in South Africa’s electricity sector, there are 
also structural path dependencies in the electricity and energy sector more broadly, around coal-
fired generation and security of supply for pre-existing Eskom plants. These path dependencies 
are compounded by a lack of transparency in decision making on electricity and power struggles 
in the policy sphere, all of which present key challenges to decarbonisation. 
South Africa’s electricity sector sits at the heart of the country’s highly energy intensive 
economy. Coal accounts for 65% of the country’s total primary energy supply and 92% of 
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electricity produced. With an economy structured around an evolving system of accumulation 
known as the minerals-energy complex, South Africa has historically relied on cheap coal and 
cheap labour for cheap electricity, for the disproportionate benefit of mining and minerals-based 
export oriented industry, with approximately 40% of the country’s electricity consumed by its 
energy-intensive industrial users. 
Such a system is, however, subject to change due to a combination of endogenous and 
exogenous factors. This includes an electricity crisis and the disintegration of closely knit 
relationships between actors in Eskom, coal and other mining companies, and the state. The 
country’s mining industry has been beset by strikes and labour unrest while national economic 
growth is in decline. Increasing electricity prices along with declining prices in international 
commodity markets have reduced the international competitiveness of many of South Africa’s 
raw and beneficiated products. With changes in international demand for the country’s coal, 
depletion of the country’s cheaper coal resources and the end of long-term coal contracts 
between tied coal mines and Eskom, the era of cheap coal is coming to an end, despite the 
continued fundamental significance of the resource to the country. At the same time, South 
Africa is under international pressure to reduce its carbon emissions. In 2009 President Jacob 
Zuma pledged to reduce carbon emissions by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025 below a business-
as-usual trajectory. South Africa’s Copenhagen pledge has since been codified in the National 
Climate Change Response White Paper (NCCRWP) and formalised in the international regime 
through South Africa’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). 
Eskom was downgraded by Standard & Poor’s to a negative credit rating in March 2015 and has 
experienced ongoing uncertainty in board and executive level governance. It is applying for 
further tariff hikes from the national energy regulator and there are ongoing discussions over the 
sale of some of the utility’s assets with the aim of attracting external investment, though, given 
the utility’s negative credit rating this is unlikely to be on favourable terms. Delays in the 
construction of Eskom’s new coal plants, Medupi and Kusile, have resulted in substantial cost 
overruns and the utility has increased its reliance on expensive diesel to power the country’s 
open cycle gas turbines in order to make up the supply side gap. 
In the midst of such changes there are various cases of decarbonisation taking place within the 
country’s electricity sector which have been encouraged by a diversity of factors. Some are due 
to conscious attempts driven by environmental and/or social concerns while others are driven by 
concerns such as energy security or power sector reform. One evident site of decarbonisation is 
found in the case of the country’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers’ 
Programme (REIPPPP). This was launched in 2011 following the inclusion of a carbon 
constraint in the country’s Integrated Resource Plan for electricity (IRP). Since then, the growth 
of a utility-scale, private sector renewable energy industry has developed its own momentum, 
supported by financial interests and those with an ideological interest in power sector reform. 
REIPPPP is internationally celebrated as a successful programme for the procurement of 
independent power from renewable energy and South Africa is now twelfth in Ernst and 
Young’s latest Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index. The prices of these renewable 
energy technologies have decreased dramatically in the past three years and wind and solar PV 
are now cost competitive with Eskom’s new build coal. But as we explore, in the short-to-
medium term such developments are unlikely to replace the important contribution that coal 
makes to the electricity sector and the economy, including its influence over national decision 
making. The path dependencies of coal will pose a significant obstacle to any moves to 
decarbonise as high-carbon development continues to take place alongside a growing 
contribution from renewable energy. This is in addition to a potential (and highly controversial) 
nuclear fleet. 
While South Africa has an ambitious national climate change strategy, the ability of climate 
policy to drive shifts in South Africa’s energy system is limited. As we demonstrate, there are 
quite separate groups of actors in the energy and climate change spheres. Many emerging trends 
in the energy sector have little to do with climate change mitigation even if they may be 
associated with low-carbon energy. The country’s electricity supply-side crisis and the 
increasing cost-competitiveness of renewable energy appear to be far greater drivers of change 
than concerns over climate change. That the IRP and REIPPPP may have had environmental 
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spin offs is more of a side effect. Further, those actors whom we would consider to be the likely 
natural allies of the Department of Environmental Affairs – notably environmental groups and 
the nascent renewables industry – either do not involve themselves in the mitigation policy 
space or have not developed the sorts of relationships and dependencies that would drive 
mitigation policy in the face of firm opposition from carbon and energy-intensive firms. 
Similarly, the poor have largely been excluded from policy processes and inclusion in a more 
equitable energy system. While electricity connections have increased significantly in the post-
apartheid era and the state has introduced a Free Basic Electricity allowance for low-income 
households, energy policy continues to be geared towards meeting the needs of large industrial 
customers. 
While there appears to be limited collaboration between the architects of environmental policy 
and the renewable energy industry, it is of note that new coalitions and networks are emerging 
between conventional and entrenched energy intensive users and more recent renewable energy 
bodies – for instance, between the energy intensive users group and the South African Wind 
Energy Association. These growing networks are collaborating on issues such as the ability of 
renewable energy IPPs to secure wheeling agreements with electricity consumers. Such shifts 
are taking place independently of national initiatives on climate change mitigation that are being 
carried out by the Department of Environmental Affairs, largely in isolation from the rest of 
government. In addition, the unquestioned assumption that coal is the optimal fuel to provide 
affordable security of supply is on the wane amongst certain consumer groups. The main 
priority for some factions of business and industry now appears to be for security of supply at an 
affordable tariff, regardless of the technology choice that generates it. There are also emerging 
concerns amongst companies that they may be held to account for the carbon that is emitted as a 
result of their electricity consumption with the implementation of carbon regulation. Renewable 
energy may, therefore, present an attractive alternative. 
There are evident tensions in South Africa between a growing ideological commitment to a 
liberalised electricity market and an attempt to hold on to a crisis-ridden state-owned utility that 
some critics have referred to as ‘crumbling and bloated’. However, it is clear that South Africa’s 
electricity supply-side crisis, which currently sees regular load-shedding across the country, has 
served as a catalyst for a number of initiatives, some of which are more low-carbon than others. 
First, it has accelerated independently procured utility-scale renewable energy under REIPPPP. 
Secondly, there are processes on-going for the procurement of co-generation, gas and baseload 
coal. Thirdly, rooftop solar PV is rapidly emerging despite the absence of an appropriate 
regulatory framework, as commercial enterprises and wealthy households seek to buy their 
independence from an unreliable and increasingly expensive national grid. This is in addition to 
further measures to facilitate the connection of non-Eskom generation to the grid, including 
wheeling agreements. Wheeling and embedded generation, both of which have historically 
faced institutional blockages suddenly appear much more attractive in the context of a supply-
side crisis and an inability by Eskom to meet demand for the foreseeable future. In this sense it 
can be argued that there is opportunity in crisis, which has facilitated moves towards 
decarbonisation.  
A fundamental factor in any analysis of the political economy of decarbonisation is that of 
decision-making in the electricity sector, which has long been and continues to be highly 
politicised. It is clear that there is a battle over which technologies should be prioritised in 
addition to which procurement models and institutional arrangements should facilitate them. 
Power struggles across government and within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) are 
evident at the level of national policy making and regulation in the electricity sector as much as 
they are in other policy sectors. Such power struggles have contributed to the substance of 
decision-making on policy being subordinated not only to ideological inconsistencies within the 
ANC and its tripartite alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South 
African Communist Party, but also to factional rivalries. Meanwhile the Presidency is trying to 
hold on to the closed decision-making system that was an important feature of the country’s 
minerals-energy complex as illustrated by the battle for nuclear procurement which appears to 
be driven by the Presidency. This raises the question of the extent to which tensions in policy-
making can be resolved, with decarbonisation as the end goal. 
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Finally, despite the emergence of new forms of generation, particularly renewable energy, 
uncertainty surrounds the ability of Eskom’s transmission and the country’s municipalities that 
control 40% of distribution to accommodate and integrate this. Such an issue may pose a serious 
obstacle to the realisation of decarbonisation measures. In addition, in a country that has 
consistently had one of the highest levels of inequality globally, the moves that are taking place 
towards decarbonisation will not necessarily benefit South Africa’s poor and marginalised. 
While the REIPPPP does contain potentially progressive requirements for community 
development and economic development, there are concerns over how they are being 
implemented. In addition, as the country’s wealthier consumers seek to buy their own energy 
security from rooftop solar PV or, less sustainably, diesel generators, low-income users who are 
connected to the electric grid risk being cut out of a system that they can no longer afford to use, 
given the country’s increasing electricity tariffs. 
Such developments evoke the question of whether we are witnessing a fundamental change in 
the country’s electricity sector. 
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1. Introduction 
South Africa’s electricity landscape is undergoing rapid change. The state-owned monopoly 
utility, Eskom, historically dependent on the country’s until recently low-cost coal supplies is in 
financial and supply-side crisis, subject to growing indebtedness and downgraded to non-
investment grade or ‘junk’ status (Fin24, 9 March 2015). South Africa has gone from one of the 
world’s cheapest electricity generators in the early 2000s to a 270% increase in electricity tariffs 
by 2015, with further increases predicted. Since late 2014 the country has experienced regular 
load-shedding which is likely to continue for at least five years to a decade. Meanwhile, a 
successful programme for the procurement of renewable energy from independent power 
producers (IPPs) has procured 6300 MW since it was introduced in 2011, generating 
approximately 2% of total electricity at the time of writing in September 2015 (CSIR, 2015). 
Processes are also underway to procure independent power from other sources, including coal, 
cogeneration and gas, as well an embedded generation programme for rooftop solar PV. A 9.6 
GW nuclear fleet is also currently under discussion and shale gas extraction is being explored. 
Both are the subject of contested debate. 
At the heart of South Africa’s highly energy-intensive economy is its electricity sector, which is 
responsible for around 45% of the country’s emissions: 237 Mt CO2-eq in 2010 (DEA, 2014). 
Coal-fired power plants account for 85% of installed capacity and 92% of electricity produced 
(IEA, 2014). Decarbonisation in the electricity sector therefore cannot be achieved without 
reducing the absolute contribution of coal-fired power at the same time as integrating renewable 
energy sources such as wind, solar photovoltaics (PV) and concentrating solar power (CSP), and 
new energy storage technologies. Energy efficiency and demand-side management measures 
such as the increase of solar water-heaters, new technologies, and behaviours are also 
significant. Decarbonisation of the electricity sector must also involve the adaptation and 
restructuring of network infrastructures and accompanying institutions, market and policy 
frameworks that currently support a carbon- intensive system of production and consumption 
(Winkler, 2007; Unruh, 2000 & 2002; Winkler & Marquard, 2009).  
There are other facets of decarbonisation that go beyond technical developments. If 
decarbonisation is also to incorporate a ‘just transition’ (Swilling and Annecke 2012) to a lower 
carbon economy, then it must also incorporate questions of economic inequality and welfare, as 
well as inclusive, transparent and democratic processes. A just transition must therefore account 
for issues such as access to energy for the poor, the role of labour and the social consequences 
of energy exploitation and infrastructure development, regardless of whether it is high or low 
carbon (COSATU 2012, Newell and Mulvaney 2013). Specifically, Swilling and Annecke 
(2012) assert that a just transition must tackle global socio-economic inequalities in terms of 
consumption and access to power, and cannot be achieved through a mode of production that 
depends on resource depletion and environmental degradation. Such a transition will require 
‘deep structural changes’ with a system of governance that includes restoration, reconstruction 
and redistributive justice.  
Ensuring that pathways to decarbonisation do not intensify or replicate the historical inequalities 
of South Africa’s current growth path is particularly challenging. As one of the most unequal 
countries in the world, access to energy in South Africa is paralleled by its major development 
challenges. This is linked to a history of racial oppression and inequality, poor access to services 
such as health and education, high levels of violence and an unemployment rate of around 25% 
(if discouraged work seekers are excluded) or 37% (when using the broader definition). In 2011 
45.5% of the population, approximately 23 million people were classified as ‘poor’, while 
20.2% of the population, approximately 10.2 million were classified as living in extreme 
poverty. Beyond that, women, children and youth experience higher levels of poverty, which 
remains highly racialised (54% of black South Africans live in poverty) (StatsSA, 2014).  
Decarbonisation therefore goes far beyond what is technologically or even economically 
feasible, to encompass a complexity of political, social and economic factors. Choosing 
pathways that avoid long-term technological lock-in (Unruh 2002), whilst prioritising socio-
economic well-being is crucial to the realisation of decarbonisation. With this in mind this paper 
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provides an in depth and historical analysis of the key features of South Africa’s electricity 
sector and the stakeholders and beneficiaries operating within it. 
An analysis of electricity policy must be context-specific, understood via an exploration that 
includes political, economic and social complexities, institutional architecture, infrastructural 
and industrial development, comparative technological advantage, historical legacies and 
geophysical factors (Rip & Kemp, 1998). In the case of South Africa this includes its large coal 
resource, its racially differentiated access to electricity as a legacy of apartheid, its centralised 
transmission grid structure, and high demand from industrial users. As we demonstrate, South 
Africa’s electricity sector is a site of complex governance arrangements, compounded by path-
dependency of techno-social systems, political and economic interests and uncertainty in the 
adoption of new technologies. 
Our analysis includes an exploration of the sector’s structure and governance; the success or 
lack thereof of key policy and regulatory developments in creating accountable systems of 
decision making and facilitating the introduction of renewable energy, particularly since the end 
of apartheid; the role of institutions and actors in shaping and/or blocking developments in 
recent decades; and the way in which new technologies, policies and institutional arrangements 
are supported or opposed and by which actors. In doing this, we illustrate some of the networks 
and power dynamics at play, and the tensions or conflicts that exist between different actors and 
coalitions within the economy and their potential influence over the transition process. Such an 
analysis is essential in order to understand competing agendas within industry, government, 
finance, labour and civil society and the dynamics of complex and long-term political, social, 
economic and technological change processes. This further highlights issues relating to the 
political culture of decision-making on energy policy at the national level, and how this interacts 
with international influences such as multilateral finance, private international investment and 
bilateral interests. Significantly it helps us to understand how technologically feasible scenarios 
of decarbonisation are either blocked or supported by political and economic forces. We find 
that while there are positive examples of decarbonisation in South Africa’s electricity sector 
there are also structural path dependencies in the electricity sector, and energy sector more 
broadly, around coal-fired generation and security of supply for existing Eskom plants. We 
further identify the lack of transparency in decision making on electricity and power struggles in 
the policy sphere as a key challenge. 
A key finding is that there has not been an emergence of powerful – or even coordinated – pro-
mitigation coalitions despite international commitments and domestic policy on climate change. 
Those groups that we would expect to be pro-mitigation are fragmented and dispersed, whereas 
coalitions concerned with maintaining the status quo are well organised and have used the 
discourse of growth, employment and competitiveness to hinder the implementation of 
mitigation policy. This has been exacerbated by the country’s fragile economic position. 
Decarbonisation of the electricity sector will require a significant scaling up of low-carbon 
infrastructure, particularly in the 2020s as coal-fired power plants begin to retire. As it stands, 
South Africa’s electricity sector is coal-dominated, with a small but significant renewable 
energy programme and the possibility of a large state-funded nuclear programme. Current 
conflicts taking place in the sector will determine whether the renewable programme remains on 
the periphery of a centrally planned and procured hybrid power market, and whether further 
power sector reform takes place and alters the control Eskom has over generation and 
transmission. These struggles over the electricity market are beyond mitigation policy but will 
potentially have important implications for decarbonisation. 
This research draws from 26 semi-structured key informant interviews undertaken in May and 
June 2015, including members of the renewable energy industry, the coal sector, finance, 
Eskom, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Nersa) and government departments. 
Given the politically and/or commercially sensitive nature of the subject matter, we have not 
listed the names or institutional affiliation of the interviewees, nor do we cite them by name. We 
have also undertaken extensive content analysis of grey literature pertaining to the energy and 
related sectors, including government documents, national policies, and industry reports; and a 
systematic consultation of relevant media, including sources such as Business Day, Engineering 
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News, Financial Times and ESI-Africa. The paper is also enriched by the authors’ combined 
long-standing and in-depth expertise and insights into South Africa’s energy sector and climate 
policy and political economy analysis. Informal discussions with contacts in the energy policy 
sphere have also helped inform some of the findings of this paper, though for obvious reasons 
they cannot be cited here.  
The researchers also undertook participant observation at various seminars and conferences 
involving members of the energy industry, national and local government, civil society and 
academia including: the Green Economy Workshop, run by the National Business Initiative, the 
Fossil Fuel Foundation’s Electricity Conference and Junior Miners Conference, McCloskey and 
CoalTrans coal conferences, the DEA’s National Climate Change Conference (held in 
November 2014) and National Climate Change Co-ordinating Committee meetings, as well as 
National Treasury’s Carbon tax stakeholder workshops. Participation at these conferences is 
highly illustrative of discursive dynamics between industry, government and finance and recent 
developments in the energy sector. Our methodology is enriched and informed by theories of 
policy processes, and literature on the challenges of researching power and policy e.g. Dryzek 
(2005), Keeley and Scoones (2003), Kingdon (1995), which has enabled us to unpack some of 
the drivers and barriers to the decarbonisation of South Africa’s electricity supply. However this 
paper is primarily a rich empirical study on emerging trends in the South African electricity 
sector, and how these do or do not contribute to a long-term transition to a lower-carbon 
economy with reduced levels of poverty and inequality. 
This research is primarily aimed at policy-makers, academics and industry practitioners who are 
concerned with, and seek understanding of, the nature of decision-making in South Africa’s 
electricity sector or who wish to make comparisons with other national contexts. This paper 
assumes some knowledge on the part of the reader on a technical level of the nature of 
electricity transmission, generation and distribution as well as a certain level of familiarity with 
the nature of politics and policy-making South Africa. The paper does not claim to offer 
straightforward policy recommendations, or what Büscher (2009: 5) would refer to as a ‘policy 
fix’ approach, but rather aims to expose the complexities of how the electricity sector, and 
subsequently its potential for decarbonisation, are embedded within a broader political 
economy. Given the breadth of the issue, the text is not exhaustive and we accept that there will 
inevitably be some empirical gaps. On that point, while this study focuses on the electricity 
sector we acknowledge the contribution that other sectors such as transport and coal-to-liquids 
make to the country’s carbon emissions. While they are not dealt with in depth here, we 
highlight them as areas for further research. 
The paper starts with a brief outline of the results of the Deep Decarbonisation Pathways Project 
(DDPP) in Section 2, a scenario analysis accompanying this this research. We then explore the 
country’s minerals-energy complex as a key description of its historical core based around 
mining and minerals-beneficiation. Such an exploration sets the scene for analysis of, firstly, the 
crucial and dominant role that Eskom has played in the economy, and, secondly, of some of the 
dynamics of the coal industry and its relationship to the electricity sector. Section 4 explores 
Eskom’s financial crisis including some of the long-term and path-dependent factors that have 
led up to it. We also raise the question as to what this crisis might mean for the future of Eskom 
as a vertically-integrated monopoly utility going forward. This is followed in Section 5 by a 
discussion of the way in which electricity is governed in South Africa and in particular some of 
the key developments in policy and regulation that have attempted to remove energy policy and 
planning from opaque processes previously dominated by Eskom and the former Department of 
Minerals and Energy. Such a consideration is continued in Section 6 that is dedicated to South 
Africa’s integrated resource plan (IRP) for electricity. We analyse how that, despite the IRP’s 
various failings and the significant role that coal will continue to play in the next 20 years, it 
still represents a step forward as the first and relatively transparent process involving public 
consultation for energy planning – although this has since been undermined by the latest draft of 
the plan having been abandoned by government. Section 7 discusses the REIPPPP as perhaps 
the most successful supply-side intervention for decarbonisation in South Africa to date. The 
section provides a brief examination of the programme and considers some of the political, 
economic and technological factors that may threaten its sustainability going forward. The 
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examination of REIPPPP is followed in Section 8 by a discussion of how embedded generation 
and roof top PV is being developed by wealthy and commercial consumers in response to recent 
load-shedding, despite the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework. Section 9 discusses 
how other moves to introduce privately generated power are emerging, namely coal, 
cogeneration, gas and embedded generation solar PV. Section 10 then discusses some of the 
technical constraints and realities of any decarbonisation of South Africa’s electricity sector and 
the implications that this has for the transmission grid. Section 11 covers wheeling, and Section 
12 is dedicated to nuclear. Significantly for this research, while nuclear is arguably ‘low-carbon’ 
and therefore could be considered as contributing to decarbonisation, there are serious doubts 
with regards to its effect on the public good and the public purse. Section 13 discusses the 
nature of South Africa’s commitments to climate change mitigation and underlines the 
disconnect that exists between climate policy and energy policy. This is followed in Section 14 
by a consideration of the carbon tax as a potentially positive move for decarbonisation. Section 
15 concludes. 
2. Rationale for this research 
This research is intended to accompany the technical work undertaken by Altieri et al (2015) 
Pathways to deep decarbonisation in South Africa. The authors used a partially linked energy 
model (ERC’s SATIM) and economy-wide computable general equilibrium model (E-sage) to 
unpack the technical complexities of meeting development objectives (reductions in poverty, 
measured as a lowering of unemployment and a shift upwards in the number of residents living 
above the poverty line) and mitigation objectives (a 14 Gt CO2-eq carbon constraint to 2050) in 
South Africa. Using South Africa’s mitigation policy as a guide to set a constraint of 14Gt CO2-
eq cumulative emissions over the period 2015-2050 but allowing the energy model to optimise 
within that, they found that it is possible to meet the mitigation target primarily through 
decarbonising electricity supply to 2050.1 The study then compared two economic pathways: the 
first decreased unemployment by increasing growth in lower carbon, higher labour-absorbing 
sectors (the Economic Structure scenario). The second scenario (termed High Skills) looked at 
the impact of injecting a considerably higher skilled population into the economy, thereby 
changing the labour force. 
In light of the country’s high levels of poverty and inequality, the economic analysis is 
particularly crucial for South Africa. South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the 
world, with a Gini co-efficient of 0,69 in 2011 (using income data) (StatsSA, 2014). In 2011, 
the richest 20% of the population accounted for over 61% of consumption, whereas the poorest 
20% accounted for only 4.3%. It is therefore essential that any path to decarbonisation does not 
replicate the historical inequalities of South Africa’s current growth path (Moe, 2010). As seen 
in Figure 1, South Africa is a global outlier in terms of the emissions-intensity of the economy 
and per capita emissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1	  	   The	  cumulative	  constraint	  spans	  the	  period	  2015	  to	  2050.	  It	  includes	  energy	  sector	  emissions	  and	  also	  some	  non-­‐energy	  	  
sector	  emissions,	  including	  fugitive	  emissions	  from	  coal	  and	  gas	  extraction,	  gas	  transportation,	  and	  production	  of	  liquid	  fuels	  
from	   coal.	   It	   excludes	   process	   emissions	   from	   industrial	   processes	   and	   other	   non-­‐energy	   sector	   emissions	   (e.g.,	   AFOLU)	  
(Altieri	  et	  al,	  2015).	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Figure 1: Emissions intensity per capita 
(Altieri et al, 2015) 
South Africa’s emissions intensity results from the structure of the energy sector and economy. 
Energy supply and demand are thus key determining factors in the realisation or impediment of 
decarbonisation. Energy emissions accounted for 78% of South Africa’s total emissions in 
2010: 428 Mt out of total emissions of 518 Mt CO2-eq (DEA, 2014). Of this, combustion of coal 
is the largest source by fuel type (Figure 2), and the production of electricity the largest source 
by sector (Figure 3).  
 
 
 
(NEE: non-energy emissions; IPE: Industrial process emissions; CTL: coal to liquid) 
 Figure 2: Emissions by fuel type 2000–2010 
(Marquard, et al, 2011) 
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(NEE: non-energy emissions; IPE: Industrial process emissions; CTL: coal to liquid) 
Figure 3: Emissions sources and trends from 2000 to 2010 
(Marquard, Trollip & Winkler, 2011) 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, the carbon constraint imposed in the energy model used in Altieri et 
al (2015) can be met primarily through a reduction in coal-fired electricity by 2050 and the 
retirement of carbon-intensive liquid fuels production (coal-to-liquid) by 2040. In short, under 
either scenario, be it a structural change to the economy or a considerably more effective 
educational/skills policy (i.e a change in the composition of the workforce), the energy sector 
emissions are reduced by reducing the contribution of coal. Since coal is a key energy 
commodity in South Africa, and an important economic sector, this is one of the most profound 
changes in the indicative pathways to decarbonisation outlined by Alteri et al (2015). For this 
reason, we dedicate significant exploration to the entrenched nature of the country’s coal 
industry, its contribution to the electricity sector and its international linkages, particularly in 
Section 3.2.  
 
Table 1: Key metrics for the Economic Structure (Scenario 1) and High Skills (Scenario 2) 
scenarios in 2010 and in 2050  
(Altieri et al, 2015) 
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Indicator Units 2010 Economic Structure 
2050 
Scenario 1 
High Skills 
2050 
Scenario 2 
Population Millions 51.5 62.3 62.3 
GDP per capita Real US$ 
2005/person 
4 825 12 973 12 294 
Unemployment % 24 12 18 
Population in low income 
bracket 
% 50 18 17 
Persons per Vehicle Person/vehicle 10.2 5.6 5.7 
Final Energy Consumption EJ 2.48 4.75 4.58 
Annual GHG Emissions Mt CO2-eq 398 241 242 
Per capita total GHG 
emissions 
Tons CO2-eq/cap 7.7 3.9 3.9 
Energy Intensity of GDP TJ/Million US$ 
2005 
10.0 5.9 6.0 
Levelised cost of electricity US$/kWh 0.056 0.110 0.106 
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Long-term scenario planning as in Altieri et al (2015) is able to highlight only a few possible 
decarbonisation pathways of potentially many. However, the specificity and longevity of 
electricity assets means that decisions made now on technology choices will have a long-term 
effect on the structure of the electricity system, the associated level of emissions and the costs of 
any future transition. Thus, while the modelling highlights that a transition to a lower-carbon 
and more inclusive economy is possible, the current dynamics of the electricity sector explored 
in this paper may either indicate a continuation of current path dependencies or the beginnings 
of a shift away from it. Thus the key questions become: What are the drivers of, and barriers to, 
long-term decarbonisation that are playing out in the short term? What decisions being made in 
the present will assist or hinder transition to a new pathway that is at once low-carbon and good 
for development? And how do the actions of different actors impact the institutional lock-in that 
may limit the transition? With such questions in mind we now begin with an analysis of the 
country’s minerals-energy complex. 
3. Context: the shifting minerals-energy complex 
South Africa’s political economy has historically been characterised by the minerals-energy 
complex (MEC).2 This refers to an evolving system of accumulation based on cheap coal used 
for the generation of cheap electricity which, coupled with cheap labour, provides input into 
export-oriented mining and minerals beneficiation (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996). The interlinkages 
within and between the energy, mining and minerals beneficiation sectors mirror an 
interconnected industrial elite that comprises private capital and state actors, and a particular 
historical dynamic of ‘conflict and coordination’. We draw on the concept because it defines a 
starting point for understanding the nature of South Africa’s energy- and carbon-intensive 
economy. It is also a useful framework for understanding some of the key trends in the 
country’s economic and political history, as well as a tool to understand environmental and 
social injustice in South Africa, including the effects of continued coal development on local 
communities (Peek & Taylor, 2014; Hallowes, 2014). 
The South African economy has historically been, and remains geared towards, an economic 
pathway that is premised on capital-and energy-intensity in the productive sectors (Altieri et al, 
2015), thus reducing the labour-intensity of growth. Structural changes to the economy and the 
workforce are thus important for increasing labour-intensive growth and economic welfare as 
well as reducing the environmental impacts from carbon-intensive, capital-intensive mineral 
extractive sectors (Winkler & Marquard, 2009; SBT, 2007; Altieri et al, 2015; Black & Roberts, 
2009). This has been recognised in policy documents across various ministries, including the 
National Planning Commissions’ National Development Plan (NDP) and in various iterations of 
the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). To date, 
however, the implementation of these policies has not significantly altered the energy, 
                                                      
2  We acknowledge that the concept has not gained wide currency amongst some mainstream economists in South 
Africa (see Seekings & Nattrass, 2006; Morris & Martin, 2014), but consider the concept useful for 
understanding path dependencies in the energy system 
Electricity generation 
Coal % 91.8 0 0 
Natural gas % 0.2 5.7 6.1 
Nuclear % 5.5 0 0 
Hydro % 2.1 1.6 1.7 
Wind on-shore % 0 15.8 16.6 
Solar PV % 0 13.0 13.0 
Solar thermal % 0 62.5 61.2 
Biomass % 0 1.3 1.4 
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emissions or employment intensity of the South African economy, and indeed minerals-based 
industrialisation remains a key pillar of the DTI’s strategy. 
South Africa has a formalised national system of innovation and policy which falls under the 
auspices of the Department of Science and Technology (DST, 2013). The DST conducts an 
annual survey according to OECD methodologies and standards and according to the 2012/2013 
survey gross domestic expenditure on research and development (R&D) amounted to R23.871 
billion at current Rand value in 2012/13. This was some 0.76% of GDP which is well below 
countries such as Brazil and China which are above 1% and well below the OECD average of 
some 2.4% (DST, 2013). The South African government is the largest funder of innovation 
through its science councils, which have significant capacity that could very plausibly be re-
directed towards decarbonisation and sustainability areas, and related research budgets for 
higher education. While there have been policy decisions to support the green economy, 
renewable energy, sustainability and related R&D as we discuss in this paper, these have not 
been realised and research expenditure in the energy sphere is still largely directed towards 
‘traditional’ areas in the petroleum sector, coal based technologies, and electricity sector 
transmission and reticulation system technologies and nuclear. Thus, similarly to policy 
attempts to reform the electricity sector discussed in this paper, attempts to significantly re-
direct R&D towards fields related to decarbonisation and sustainability remain at level of 
rhetoric while the traditional MEC incumbents maintain their dominance. 
Central to the MEC concept is the system of relationships between the private sector and state 
or parastatal entities. Thus the MEC can be understood as an ‘architecture’ (Freund, 2010) 
which encompasses critical links and networks of power between the financial sector, 
government, the private sector and parastatals, such as the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) and Eskom. Similarly Marquard (2006: 71) describes the South African economy as an 
associated ‘industrial policy complex’, ‘consisting of a number of overlapping policy networks 
… and coordinated by what can be termed an “industrial policy elite” concentrated in agencies 
such as the IDC and the state’s economic planning machinery, with close connections to the 
political elite’. 
Twenty years after the transition to democracy, the homogeneity of the MEC and the formal and 
informal institutions underpinning it has been subject to economic and political change, due to a 
combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Such changes include shifts in the 
contribution of different sectors to GDP, for example the increased role of finance and tertiary 
sectors in the country’s economy (Ashman et al, 2012), the internationalisation and 
diversification of the country’s mining houses, the introduction of a black economic elite 
(Tangri & Southall, 2008), the introduction of renewable energy (Baker, 2014), significant 
shifts in the coal market (Burton & Winkler, 2014), and substantial changes in energy and 
mineral policy. South Africa’s economy is now increasingly characterised by consumption-
driven growth and services. The country’s financial and business services now account for 24% 
of GDP, the single largest economic sector in terms of contribution to GDP (Bhorat et al, 
2014).3 
While, however, the relative contribution that mining, minerals-beneficiation and related 
manufacturing now make to the South African economy is declining (Figure 5), these sectors 
remain important to the productive economy. The country’s exports are still primarily 
commodities, coal is the third-largest export by value (StatsSA, 2015), and mining exports are 
key to maintaining a positive balance of payments. Perhaps more importantly, amongst many 
actors in government and business, there exists the idea that growth and development in South 
                                                      
3  South African household indebtedness has doubled in recent years (StatsSA, 2014). So while growth in retail in 
particular has increased, this is based largely on imported goods and consumer debt. Thus while the structure of 
sectoral contribution to GDP has changed, those higher growth sectors do not for the most part reflect any 
upstream domestic manufacturing growth. The productive mining and minerals sectors, while not labour-
intensive sectors comparatively, nonetheless are large absolute employers – jobs that are important in a context 
of 25% or 37% unemployment. This contradiction between the decline in manufacturing and growth in services 
without socio-economic development is a key industrial policy challenge for South Africa, and the DTI’s 
support for mineral beneficiation stems from an assumption that downstream minerals beneficiation will 
provide labour-absorbing manufacturing growth.  
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Africa simply cannot take place without the country leveraging its ‘mineral wealth’ or using its 
‘comparative advantage’ in energy-intensive beneficiation (ANC, 2011; DMR, 2013; DTI 2010-
2015; DTI, 2014). 
The country’s mining industry has been beset by strikes and labour unrest while national 
economic growth is in decline. The World Bank (2015) has estimated that South Africa will 
have GDP growth of 1.5% in 2015, and has revised its 2016 and 2017 forecasts downwards to 
1.7% and 2% respectively. With changes in international demand for the country’s coal (from 
Europe to India), depletion of the country’s cheaper coal resources and the end of long-term 
coal contracts between tied coal mines and Eskom, the era of cheap coal is coming to an end 
(Burton & Winkler, 2014). Ownership of assets is shifting in response to investment strategies 
by mining houses and growing pressure from government for increased black economic 
empowerment (BEE) ownership of mining houses. Delays at Eskom’s new coal plants have 
resulted in substantial cost overruns. Increasing electricity prices together with declining prices 
in international commodity markets have reduced the international competitiveness of many of 
South Africa’s beneficiated products while international greenhouse gas emissions agreements 
are placing further pressure on an already fragile economy. 
The nature of many entrenched relationships has also been subject to significant shifts. As 
McDonald (2009) has previously argued, the relationship between ‘big state and big capital is 
changing’ and, as we illustrate, relationships between and within different state, industrial and 
financial sectors are increasingly dispersed and fragmented. While elements of the relationship 
between the state and energy-intensive business remain intact, there are emerging changes that 
could potentially herald new processes around energy and climate change policy in the future. 
As we show, however, much of this change arises, not from mitigation concerns, but rather from 
parallel economic, technological and ideological pressures. If it continues it could thus play out 
contrary to requirements for a transition to a low-carbon economy. 
A further shift can be found in the activities of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). 
Historically the IDC has been the main financing mechanism to support industrial investment 
and growth in heavy industry, providing loan and equity finance at low interest rates and 
leveraging significant amounts of private investment (Roberts, 2007: 26; Fine & Rustomjee, 
1996: 151). It has had a strong decision-making role in large industrial enterprises as a 
shareholder and beneficiary. Since it was set up during the Smuts era in 1940 by an act of 
parliament, its lending patterns have had a huge influence on core MEC activities (Freund, 
2010:18), having provided instrumental support for many industrial mega-projects. The IDC has 
historically been oriented to the development of extremely large-scale minerals beneficiation 
projects, with close links to previously state-owned enterprises as well as the major 
conglomerates. Creamer (5 August, 2011) states that it ‘provides something of a mirror image 
of South Africa’s recent economic and industrial past’ and that ‘its funding has supported ‘old 
economy’ and energy-hungry mainstays, such as miners and steelmakers, fertiliser and 
aluminium manufacturers, and even an unlikely coal-to-fuels success story’.  
However, the IDC’s support to the mining and manufacturing sector has recently declined, at 
the same time as its investment in the country’s emerging renewable energy industry has 
increased. In the past three years it has supported 24 projects with financial commitments 
totalling R14 billion. Under Rounds one and three of REIPPPP the IDC has committed R13.2 
billion to 22 projects (IDC, 2014). Such support is for projects as well as associated 
manufacturing and assembly plants, in alignment with the country’s New Growth Path (EDD, 
2010). Renewable energy projects constituted 40% of the funding approved during financial 
year 2013/14, with the IDC playing a major part in support of REIPPPP, especially 
concentrating solar power projects (EDD, 2014: 45). Mining and minerals beneficiation and 
upstream chemicals received 18% of funding approved, while more labour-intensive industries, 
such as downstream chemicals, metal products and clothing and textiles, received 23%.  
These policy processes must be understood as embedded in a broader political context. Not only 
is the African National Congress (ANC) itself characterised by ideological differences and 
factions within the party, but it must also accommodate both organised labour, the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), and the South African Communist Party (SACP), with 
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which it forms the Tripartite Alliance. As Gumede (2007: 305) explains, ‘the ANC has always 
been seen as a broad church, with communists, Christians, conservatives, social democrats, 
Christian democrats, Christian socialists, liberals, Africanists and traditionalists all claiming it 
as a political home’. Besides historical internal divisions, the means by which Zuma came to 
power and the dynamic of his presidency has highlighted further factional divisions within the 
party that are often more about networks of patronage than about questions of policy (Butler, 
2010, 2013, & 05 June, 2015; ANC, 2015). 
Organised labour has furthermore fallen into internal disarray, with, for example, the important 
Cosatu union the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) having faced growing competition 
from new unions such as the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) that 
are not ANC-aligned. In late 2014 Cosatu ejected the National Union of Metalworkers 
(NUMSA). While parts of organised labour provide a progressive voice on climate change 
mitigation policy, environmental justice and a just transition, such statements do not appear to 
have any real impact given the realities of the carbon-intensity of many important union sectors. 
The supply-side crisis in the electricity sector, discussed in Section 4, which has resulted in 
regular load shedding since late 2014 and rising electricity tariffs, has further exposed fragilities 
in the MEC. Shifts in international and national energy markets, including coal ( Section 3.2) 
and renewable energy ( Section 7) have also undermined the historical structural stability of the 
MEC. At the same time, investment in coal and coal-related infrastructure, such as power 
plants, rail export lines and new mines, continues, the state attempts to promote new entrants in 
the energy sector, firms and business groupings continue to attempt to maintain the structural 
elements of the past and yet lack the coordination of the past. As we now discuss Eskom, as the 
state electricity utility, has long been a central actor within the MEC and played a central 
facilitating role in the country’s carbon-intensive path dependency. However, now crisis-ridden 
and struggling with high levels of debt, questions are raised over how long it may maintain its 
monopoly position in generation, transmission, and distribution, what this means for the 
coordination required for economic development, and, significantly, what implications this 
might have for the realisation of decarbonisation. 
3.1 Eskom 
As South Africa’s vertically integrated state-owned monopoly, Eskom is the primary generator 
and sole transmitter of electricity via the country’s high-voltage transmission grid. Eskom has 
an installed capacity of 42 GW, comprising 35.7 GW coal-fired stations, 1.8 GW nuclear, 2.4 
GW gas-fired stations, 600 MW hydro and 1.40 GW pumped storage stations, as well as the 
recently commissioned 100 MW Sere Wind Farm (Eskom, 2015a). As can be seen, 85% of 
installed capacity comes from 13 coal-fired power plants, many immediately adjacent to 
privately owned coal mines. Figure 4 shows Eskom generation (concentrated in the north-east 
of the country) and transmission lines connecting to load in other parts of the country. 
Meanwhile the power purchased from IPPs made up 2.7% of total sales of 216 274 GWhs in 
2014/2015 (Eskom, 2015a). 
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Figure 4: Generation and transmission infrastructure 
 (Eskom, 2015a) 
Despite installed capacity of 42GW, many of the utility’s generating units are non-functional. 
Of Eskom’s 121 generating units, only 49 are in a healthy state, with 26 units in a poor 
condition and 32 in a critical state, having been taken out of service for major maintenance. The 
utility is therefore struggling to meet peak demand of less than 30 000 MW in summer and 35 
000 MW on cold winter days (Creamer 18 June, 2015a) due to poor plant availability and high 
outages, with unplanned maintenance of around 8GW4. Load shedding has therefore taken place 
throughout 2015, in accordance with the levels of planned and unplanned maintenance. This 
capacity shortfall is the main driver of the current electricity crisis and has become a catalyst for 
institutional shifts in the electricity sector.  
Lack of available capacity is partly due to failed attempts to liberalise the power sector in the 
early 2000s, as we discuss in more depth in Section 4.2 (see also Eberhard, 2007). As part of 
this process, Eskom was prevented in 2001 by Cabinet from investing in new capacity. 
However, when it became apparent that new private investment would not be forthcoming and 
given that at the time new capacity could not compete with Eskom’s tariffs, and moreover there 
was no institutional framework for private sector investment and access to the grid, Eskom was 
permitted in 2005 to invest in new generation capacity. The result was that two coal-fired power 
plants Medupi and Kusile and the Ingula pumped storage scheme were approved. Due to 
numerous delays they are currently still under construction, with only one unit of Medupi 
commissioned thus far. This has contributed to the capacity shortfalls.  
                                                      
4  Eskom’s energy availability factor has declined considerably over the past 15 years: from 92% in 2001 to only 
75% in the 2013/14 financial year (Eskom, 2003:3; Eskom 2014: 89). This is due to lack of maintenance and an 
ageing fleet of power stations. 
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Table 2: Eskom sales by customer category, 2014/2015  
(Source: Eskom 2015a) 
Sector Total sales (216 274 GWh) 
Municipalities 42.1% 
Industrial 24.7 
Mining 13.8% 
International 5.6% 
Residential 5.4% 
Commercial 4.5% 
Agriculture 2.5% 
Rail 1.4% 
 
Eskom is directly responsible for 58% of sales to end-users, while municipal distributors 
purchase their energy and services from Eskom and supply about two thirds of the country’s 
customers who account for the remaining 42% of sales (see Table 2). Municipal distributors are 
dominated by the large metropolitan distributors, such as City Power, which reap significant 
profits from their on-selling of electricity and cross-subsidise municipal rates for services such 
as waste collection and roads. This system has created perverse incentives to limit small- and 
medium-scale embedded generation within cities, despite rising costs of electricity and supply 
shortages. Own generation by large energy-intensive users remains limited due to the 
regulatory/licensing system, as do options for bilateral contracts and wheeling of electricity. We 
discuss this in more detail in Section 11. 
The post-apartheid state’s commitment to the universal provision of electricity as part of the 
ANC’s national electrification programme was in conflict with its continued servicing of the 
demands of industry, which has consistently taken preference over household use.5 While 85% 
of households are now connected to the grid (StatsSA, 2011) as compared to 30% during 
apartheid (Bekker et al, 2008), residential consumption of electricity remains low for many 
households, and many low-income users rely solely on the state’s Free Basic Electricity 
allowance. Residential consumption contributes significantly to peak demand on the system, but 
in general remains at around 20% of total sales for South Africa either directly from Eskom or 
through municipalities). Newly connected, usually poor, households are not large consumers of 
electricity (see Table 2), despite claims to the contrary, with concomitant sub-optimal health, 
welfare and education outcomes. Eskom’s residential sales (which are primarily poorer 
households) have consistently accounted for around 5% of total sales (5.4% currently), and have 
not grown significantly despite the electrification programme.  
Since its inception in the 1920s, Eskom’s very reason for being has been as a provider of 
electricity as an input for heavy industry, notably mining and minerals processing sectors. As 
pointed out by Fine & Rustomjee, Eskom has fulfilled a ‘particularly important function in 
lubricating both the growth of MEC core sectors and the ascendance of large-scale private 
capital’ (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996: 97). Thus, as the utility expanded its capacity, particularly 
from the 1970s onwards, to meet growing demand from energy-intensive mining, first gold, 
then later ferrous metals and platinum group metals, it also awarded coal contracts to encourage 
the growth of what was viewed as domestic/local capital or ‘Afrikaner capital’ during apartheid. 
These companies are contrasted against what was viewed by the state as ‘imperial’ or foreign 
capital, companies that had developed as foreign investors.  
On the consumption side, this has resulted in a demand profile that remains skewed towards 
industrial users. The Energy Intensive Users Group, which is composed of Eskom’s 31 largest 
customers, consumes approximately 44% of the electricity produced by the utility (EIUG, 
                                                      
5 Electrification was largely limited to white South Africans and industry during apartheid. Eskom commenced 
more widespread electrification in the late 1980s, and electrification has remained a key ANC policy since 
1994. Although the number of connected households has risen considerably access remains limited and 
unaffordable for many. 
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2015). Eskom’s large customers include mining houses that received cheap electricity during 
apartheid as well as companies who received some of the cheapest electricity in the world under 
deals made in the 1990s when the utility had substantial overcapacity (e.g. BHP-Billiton/South 
32’s Hillside aluminium smelter and Xstrata/Glencore ferrochrome projects). Over 80% of coal 
supply to Eskom remains concentrated in major mining firms that originated or grew out of 
firms that originated in apartheid-era South Africa: Anglo American, Exxaro, South 32 and 
Glencore. 
However, while Eskom has long served to benefit the interests of the coal mines who supply it 
at one end and the energy-intensive users who benefit from it at the other, recent developments, 
including the introduction of privately generated power, particularly the baseload IPP 
programme ( Section 9) suggest that it is starting to lose its monopoly control over the country’s 
electricity supply sector. Arguments for the expansion of privately generated power or reform of 
the electricity supply industry have gained traction in light of Eskom’s financial and supply-side 
crises. 
Due to its isolation under apartheid, Eskom evaded the global trend of power sector 
liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s which was supported by the World Bank as part of 
structural adjustment programmes. This trend, which was largely based on the experience of 
high income countries, saw a shift away from a usually publicly-owned, vertically integrated 
monopoly utility to a model based on privatisation and competition. Known as the ‘standard 
model’ of power sector reform, this would involve a series of steps of reform, including the 
unbundling of a monopoly utility into separate transmission, generation and distribution 
companies, the introduction of independent regulation, commercialisation and corporatisation, 
and the introduction of wholesale and eventually retail competition. Such a model has since lost 
traction in light of repeated failings in low- and middle-income countries. In many cases it has 
been replaced by more diverse models of ‘hybrid power markets’ where incumbent utilities 
remain the dominant player while IPPs generate alongside them (Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008). 
The South African electricity supply industry now finds itself in this position. Eskom holds the 
monopoly on generation, transmission and 60% of distribution. However, key functions that 
historically fell to Eskom, such as planning and procurement, are now the ambit of the 
Department of Energy (DoE) or the IPP office (see Section 5 for a discussion of roles and 
functions), as legislation has evolved. This has brought with it tensions as Eskom seeks to 
maintain its monopoly position while facing severe financial and technical crises as we go on to 
explore in Section 4. First, though, we turn to the central role that coal has played in South 
Africa’s electricity sector and its MEC more generally and that, as we discuss, poses a 
significant challenge to the realisation of major national shift towards decarbonisation. 
3.2 The coal sector 
Key to understanding the structural elements of the MEC is the role coal plays in South Africa’s 
energy system, both in the conversion to electricity by Eskom, and to liquid fuels by Sasol. In 
turn, electricity, direct coal use and liquid fuels are important inputs into the mining, 
concentrating, smelting and refining of various commodities, including coal, gold (now in 
geological decline), platinum group metals, manganese, chrome and iron and steel. These 
commodities are then exported either as ore that is unbeneficiated or beneficiated to various 
degrees up to a refined product, while also linking back into the production of other mining 
products. Similarly, Sasol converts coal and natural gas6 into liquids that are used both for 
energy and as feedstock for a chemicals complex.7 The economy remains highly dependent on 
mineral-extractive and energy-intensive industries, however, especially for exports and 
employment (given the low levels of employment in the economy). As discussed in the previous 
                                                      
6  This is currently a small proportion of the input into Sasol’s proprietary coal-to-liquid (CTL) process but under 
various gas-supply/price scenarios presents a potential driver for future large gas-to-liquids prospects, building 
on/substituting for the current CTL. 
7  Key to the original conception was the idea that, while South Africa appeared to have industrialised, this was 
merely a misrepresentation of downstream beneficiated minerals as manufactured goods, which gave the 
economy the appearance of diversification out of mining and into manufacturing. 
The political economy of decarbonisation: Exploring the dynamics of South Africa’s electricity sector 14 
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE 
section, Eskom is the fulcrum on which the input of coal and outputs of cheap electricity turned, 
with large mining houses providing coal at one end and receiving electricity for the extraction 
and refining of other commodities at the other.  
As was seen in Figure 2 coal accounts for the majority of South African emissions. The sector 
contributes roughly 1% directly to GDP, but more importantly, it is a key input to the remainder 
of the mining and minerals-extracting economy that evolved in response to low electricity 
prices. Therefore any shift towards decarbonisation of the electricity sector would significantly 
affect the coal sector and the South African economy more broadly. Since the 1990s, there has 
been a relatively stable set of actors and institutions in the coal sector,8 but the sector is 
undergoing three major shifts: changing global markets, geological decline and increasing 
production costs, and the entrance of new firms and ownership structures. These shifts are 
causing conflict between firms, Eskom and the state.  
The evolution of the MEC required closely aligned state and private-capital coordination and 
decision-making. For example, Eskom’s expansion of generating capacity in the 1970s to match 
mineral output and growth in mines was linked to the development of a coal export railway line 
by the state-owned railways and dedicated coal export terminals by mine-owners. This required 
coordination between railways, private miners and Eskom. The railway line, developed in 1976 
and connected to the privately owned Richard’s Bay coal terminal, allowed South Africa to 
export beneficiated (washed) coal to Europe while using either the ‘middlings’ (i.e. the coal that 
remains after washing) or low-grade run-of-mine domestic coal for Eskom. This resulted in 
cheap coal for Eskom as the coal was either mined and sold on long-term cost-plus contracts at 
‘tied’ mines connected to power plants via conveyors, or at fixed prices from multi-product 
mines. Exports allowed mining houses to recoup their capital and indirectly cross-subsidise the 
Eskom supply as returns could be met from exports (Eberhard, 2011; Burton & Winkler, 2014). 
Politically, coal contracts also enabled Afrikaner empowerment to take place through the sale of 
the assets of so-called ‘imperial’ capital to new mining houses. In this, the role of state-directed 
finance through the IDC and Eskom coal contracts was key (Baker, 2014; Marquard, 2006), for 
example in the development of Gencor (which became BHP Billiton and has now become South 
32). 
The diversification of the coalmining sector has similarly brought with it tensions and problems. 
The stable post-apartheid relationship between major mining houses and Eskom has evolved as 
major mining houses have internationalised their operations and new players have entered the 
market. Not only are major mining houses subject to increasing pressure to grow their BEE 
ownership shares, but the state is attempting to develop new BEE miners. Current low 
commodity prices are concurrently impacting company returns, precisely as relations between 
government and the sector have deteriorated because of new export regulations in the 2013 
amendments to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act which propose 
ministerial discretion over coal and other mineral exports.  
While South Africa is a relatively low cost producer of coal, various drivers are putting the 
industry under pressure. Although the industry historically exported primarily to Europe, 
exports have ‘swung’ to the Pacific market as demand for lower-grade coal (notably from India) 
has grown. More than half of South Africa’s coal exports now go to the East. This swing 
resulted in growing competition between domestic consumers – primarily Eskom – and the 
export market, thus exposing Eskom to increasing price pressure (IEA, 2014) during the 
commodities boom and up until export prices collapsed in 2013. This was exacerbated by long-
term contracts between Eskom and the country’s major coalmining companies coming to an 
end. This, as well as underperformance at certain tied mines, has forced Eskom into procuring 
coal increasingly on short-term contracts at spot market prices.  
Price increases and quality issues at certain tied mines have contributed to growing distrust 
between mining houses and the utility, exacerbated further by inconsistent procurement policies 
                                                      
8  Anglo American, Exxaro, South 32 (BHP-Billiton spin-off) and Glencore (former Xstrata assets) produce over 
80% of South Africa’s thermal coal; with Sasol, these five major producers account for 85% of total production. 
But there is an active and growing contribution from ‘junior miners’ with smaller outputs. 
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driven by BEE imperatives and legislative attempts to reduce export coal competition. This is 
exemplified by the failure of Eskom and Anglo American to sign a coal contract for the Kusile 
power station. Eskom is insisting that procurement of coal for Kusile is only possible from a 
50% plus 1 black-owned firm, even though this is higher than the Mining Charter requires 
(Burton & Winkler, 2014). Similarly, throughout the commodities boom, Transnet, the state-
owned rail and ports company that runs the coal export line and port, threatened to construct its 
own export terminal for BEE/junior miners, thereby altering the closely co-ordinated coal 
export industry in favour of state-supported BEE. Transnet has also invested in expansion of the 
export rail line, although the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) was at the same time 
trying to pass legislation that would limit the export of ‘strategic minerals’, including coal, to try 
and protect Eskom from price increases through regulating coal exporters (MPRDA, 2012).  
While export prices of coal are now substantially lower – prices have fallen by half over the past 
two years, and are down to around $50/t (Creamer 08 October, 2015) – the historical structure 
of the coal market, premised on high-grade exports and lower-grade domestic use of thermal 
coal, is a thing of the past. These market developments and the loss of cross-subsidisation of 
earnings for mining houses from exports have been exacerbated by geological decline in the 
Central Basin. This has added to the costs of extraction and beneficiation which are then passed 
on to Eskom, increasing logistical costs for Eskom (as it rails and trucks coal rather than using 
conveyors from tied mines), already under political pressure to adhere to BEE procurement. 
Smaller, often black-owned mines are often not located at the mine mouth and come with 
similar cost issues. Since the collapse of global export prices, Eskom coal contracts appear more 
lucrative for miners, especially once export transport costs are accounted for. But whether the 
international seaborne coal trade is in structural decline or subject to cyclically low prices, and 
whether international prices will bounce back and re-create competition for lower-grade coal, is 
unknown. Despite higher export volumes, the coal industry is seeing falling revenues from 
exports, placing it under pressure just as domestic pressures increase (rising costs, BEE 
compliance, strikes).  
Major mining houses appear to be losing confidence in South African investments. BHP-
Billiton last year spun off its South African assets (amongst others) into a new company, 
South32, while there are rumours that Anglo will sell its Eskom-linked mines in response to 
BEE imperatives. Glencore, which entered the South African coal market through buying up 
smaller miners and merging with Xstrata, is currently embroiled in a legal case over coal supply 
with Eskom at its Optimum Colliery. Even BEE major Exxaro has criticised Eskom’s policy on 
changing the structure of coal contracts. Sasol has invested in new coal mines but is subject to 
different downstream regulation through the liquid fuels pricing regime.  
The protracted and widespread conflict is quite different to the way Eskom and miners 
coordinated the development of the coal industry in the past, with Eskom putting in capital and 
miners earning a return on their costs, or miners converting mines to ones that served both the 
export market and Eskom demand. The conflict also comes at a time of rapidly increasing costs 
and declining prices. Even though Glencore is viewed as having a more export market-oriented 
pricing approach (Maharaj, 2012: 5) all the mining houses are under pressure to ensure their 
assets perform, measured against potential investments elsewhere in the world. And new 
investments in mines by the major mining houses depend on the return that Eskom contracts can 
ensure – something that has become a bone of contention between Eskom and the major mining 
houses. Given capital constraints facing Eskom, the cost-plus mine model is also likely coming 
to an end. Brian Molefe, the recently appointed CEO of Eskom and former CEO of Transnet, 
has called for the scrapping of cost-plus coal contracts and has claimed that Eskom can put out 
competitive tenders for new coal contracts, not necessarily linked to tied mines. Again, this 
depends on particular resources, beneficiation and logistics costs, but would open up the market 
to newer entrants, specifically black-owned and other junior miners.9  
                                                      
9  Eskom had proposed the development of an ‘emerging miners fund’ to assist black-owned (and emerging, i.e. 
excluding Exxaro) miners from entering the market. However, the capital required was not available and Eskom 
appears to have dropped the plan. 
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Thus, even without the potential implications of mitigation policy on demand for coal, market 
shifts and internal dynamics are causing the sector to face significant coordination challenges. 
Path dependencies and existing infrastructure will lead to the continued use of coal for the 
foreseeable future, even as mitigation policy increases longer-term pressure on the sector. At the 
same time, new and sometimes politically connected entrants are creating a new set of interests 
in the coal sector that not only satisfies the state’s interest in the creation of a new black elite but 
also leads to further infrastructural, institutional and political lock-in of a coal-based energy 
system and pattern of industrial development.  
4. Opportunity and crisis 
Eskom faces a capital crisis and a cash-flow crisis,10 the symptoms of which include load-
shedding since late 2014 and power outages in 2006, 2007 and 2008. Reasons for South 
Africa’s electricity supply crisis are complex and deep-seated and the culmination of events 
over many years, including a failed attempt at power sector reform (see Eberhard 2005, 2007; 
Gaunt, 2008; Baker, 2012; Trollip et al, 2014).  
Since 2005 Eskom has been struggling to build 17 GW of new generation capacity whilst also 
facing a $17 billion funding gap to 2018. In March 2015 Eskom saw its investment rating 
downgraded to ‘junk’ status by Standard & Poor’s (Fin24 19 March, 2015). The utility is 
severely under-capitalised due to a depreciation of assets that have not been replaced over time 
and tariffs that are not cost-reflective despite recent dramatic increases. The crisis is exacerbated 
by the fact that many municipalities are in arrears and collectively owe the utility R4 billion, 
while Eskom also faces the ongoing problem of electricity theft through illegal connections. 
Given the lack of functional generation capacity, Eskom has been relying on its open-cycle gas 
turbines (OCGTs) to make up the capacity shortfall since late 2014. Load factors for the OCGTs 
were 19.3% in financial year 2013/14 but they are supposed to be run only to meet peak demand 
at load factors of less than 6% (Eskom, 2014). The OCGTs cost roughly R3.50/kWh to run, 
compared to Eskom’s average tariff of around R0.79/kWh. This heavy reliance on OCGTs has 
been justified with a claim by Eskom CEO Brian Molefe that it is still economically cheaper 
than load-shedding (Theron 24 June, 2015), although such a claim would depend on 
assumptions about the cost of unserved energy. Regardless, the use of the OCGTs has come 
with significant financial cost to Eskom to keep the lights on.  
In 2010 Eskom received a $3 billion loan from the World Bank as a ‘lender of last resort’ for its 
Eskom Investment Support Project, of which the bulk went to the 4800 MW Medupi coal-fired 
power plant. Medupi has since been subject to labour unrest, delays and cost escalations with 
the final bill estimated to be between R155 billion and R300 billion (News24 03 July, 2015). 
Other new build projects, namely the Kusile coal-fired power plant, also 4800 MW and the 
1330 MW Ingula pumped storage scheme have also been significantly delayed. Eskom sales 
have stagnated since 2007 at around 217 TWhs, for which contributing factors include supply-
side constraints, decreased demand caused by low growth rates, and some energy-efficiency and 
demand-side management interventions (Eskom Integrated Demand Management has reduced 
load by just under 4GW since 2005 (Eskom, 2014: 113). 
The electricity supply side crisis can be described as a ‘trigger event’ in policy terms (Keeley & 
Scoones, 2003) or a ‘policy window’11of opportunity (Kingdon, 1995) for a diversification of 
generation sources and procurement models from IPPs. Not only are new supply-side 
technologies gaining traction, including co-generation, coal, gas and renewables as we discuss 
in Sections 7, 8, and 9, but pressure to reform the sector has grown. In the words of one industry 
                                                      
10 The minister responsible for representing the shareholder (government) Lynne Browne (Department of Public 
Enterprises) has explicitly acknowledged the crisis. There has not only been a protracted supply shortfall, but 
also the need for a substantial financial bail-out. Also, the IEA has used the word crisis to refer to electricity 
shortfalls of the type faced by South Africa (IEA, 2005).  
11 Kingdon (1995): Policy windows emerge when a ‘focusing event’ occurs (usually a crisis, though not always). 
At the same time, potential policy solutions and political forces emerge to create an opportunity for change 
(Marquard, 2006: 28). 
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member ‘the crisis is a wonderful lever’. In the words of another, ‘the impasse around Eskom’s 
role is almost impossible to resolve without crisis. The ideology is so deeply entrenched it needs 
to be resolved by crisis’. Thus, while ideological preferences in the ANC may not have been 
resolved one way or another, Eskom’s position is becoming increasingly tenuous as it is placed 
under pressure to accommodate new entrants, faces significant cost overruns in its new build 
programme, and the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Nersa) continues to limit 
Eskom’s requests for tariff increases in the face of increasing financial and operational costs.  
This crisis has also become the basis on which emerging coalitions and alliances are forming 
around new technology options and procurement models. As we describe in section 5.5, this 
includes the country’s traditional energy-intensive users collaborating with relatively new 
renewable energy associations. And, as we further discuss in Section 12, the crisis is also being 
used as justification for a potential 9.6 GW nuclear fleet. One civil society member stated that 
‘there is panic in government due to load shedding’ and this could lead to decisions being 
rushed through without appropriate consideration or transparency. Such ‘panic in government’ 
has also contributed to staff changes at the utility, including a series of acting CEOs and board-
level shenanigans. This has since settled somewhat with the permanent appointment of Brian 
Molefe in September 2015. Additionally, a Cabinet-level ‘war room’ has been set up to 
coordinate a response to load-shedding in the government (Section 5.3).  
We turn now to provide some of the detail of Eskom’s financial crisis and the developments that 
have unfolded in attempts to deal with this. 
4.1 Financial crisis, cash flow and tariff hikes12 
In recent years South Africa’s National Energy Regulator (Nersa) has approved significant tariff 
increases for Eskom under the multi- year price determinations (MYPD) albeit below the 
amounts applied for. Tariffs are now, and continue to be, below full cost-reflectivity but have 
also increased sharply in response to the revaluing of Eskom’s asset base and increasing costs. 
However, Eskom’s recent applications for tariff increases under MYPD 2 and 3 (see Annex 1) 
have resulted in revenue significantly lower than applied for, leading Eskom to refer to a ‘hole’ 
in its financing of approximately R250 billion in 2013 (FIN24 22 October, 2014). 
Eskom’s financial crisis is further exacerbated by the costs of Eskom’s Medupi and Kusile 
power plants which have increased significantly since they were announced in 2005. The final 
cost remains unknown for both plants, given the uncertainties around delays and Eskom’s cost 
of capital. As things stand, the costs of both power plants do not compare favourably with 
REIPPPP prices which as demonstrated in Section 7, have fallen substantially throughout the 
four bidding rounds, nor with the anticipated prices of new smaller-scale coal IPPs. As 
discussed in Section 9.1, the coal baseload programme is capped at R0.82/kWh (in April 2014 
Rand) (DoE, 2014). Eskom’s average tariff for 2015/16 is R0.79c/kWh (Eskom, 2015b: 28), 
which means that the renewable energy projects in the more recent rounds have now either 
reached or are close to reaching grid parity. 
The disparity in costs between Eskom’s new build plants versus new private sector power has 
added to criticisms of Eskom's monopoly position, raised concern over the complexities of 
regulating a monopoly utility, and drawn attention to the inflexibility and cost overruns of 
megaprojects (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius & Rothengatte, 2003). IPPs have added new renewable 
energy capacity quickly, typically on budget and with significant decreases in price, although 
the initial rounds remain significantly more expensive than Eskom's average tariff (R0.79/kWh 
in 2015). This stands in contrast to the potential overruns of a fleet of nuclear megaprojects and 
the as yet unknown final costs of Medupi and Kusile. Questions around institutional design and 
incentives are not new (Steyn, 2001) but comparisons between Eskom and REIPPPP have 
provided further support to those who argue that restructuring the electricity sector may be 
necessary.  
                                                      
12  For more in-depth detail, see Annex. 
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Finally Eskom’s financial crisis has been paralleled by a governance crisis significant upheaval 
in its leadership in recent years. Since 2007 it has seen six different chairs of the board, seven 
chief executive officers and six chief financial officers.13 On 25 June 2015, Eskom’s finance 
director resigned, after being suspended by the Board along with three other senior executives, 
including the CEO and executive for group capital. The chairman of the board also resigned 
subsequently. Eskom is thus facing concurrent financial crises and conflict and instability at the 
board and executive level. This is reflected in the inability of the utility to offer credible plans of 
how it is dealing with the on-going supply crisis which has led to a further blurring of the 
multiple lines of accountability for security of supply through the DOE and DPE and Nersa, and 
with the establishment of a further governance element in the form of the ‘War Room’ as we 
now discuss in Section 4.2.  
4.2 Restructuring of Eskom  
In 1994 the Office of Public Enterprises (now Department) of the new democratic government 
announced plans to improve Eskom’s governance and restructure it, along with the country’s 
four largest state-owned enterprises (Eberhard, 2005). Subsequently the 1998 White Paper on 
Energy Policy (DME, 1998) promised a gradual liberalisation of the power sector. A Cabinet 
memo in 2001 announced that 30% of generation, including renewable energy, would come 
from IPPs (BDlive 23 August, 2010). The White Paper also envisaged that Eskom would be 
corporatised and would outsource various functions, in line with the standard model of reform. 
For instance, it anticipated that the electricity distribution industry would be restructured to 
consist of six independent regional electricity distributors (REDs); that separate transmission 
utility and system operator (Transco) would then be created and owned by the state with a view 
to possible sale in the future (Bekker et al, 2008: 3129; Gaunt, 2008). However, key aspects of 
the White Paper were never implemented and remain highly contested (see Eberhard, 2004) for 
a full history of failed liberalisation). This includes the setting up of a separate transmission 
utility in the form of an Independent System Market Operator (see Section 5.2). 
The supply-side crisis has provided further impetus to these unresolved policy conflicts with 
regards to the restructuring of Eskom and the broader electricity supply industry. As a further 
response to the crisis in May 2015, the country’s National Treasury announced that it was 
considering the sale of some of state-owned monopoly Eskom’s ‘non-core’ assets. According to 
newspaper reports there are conflicting opinions between and within different government 
departments and members of the ruling party the ANC on this matter. For instance, in May 2015 
Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown stated that she was opposed to the sale of Eskom’s 
assets, in direct contradiction to statements made by the head of the ANC’s Economic 
Transformation Committee Enoch Godongwana. At the same time, the Treasury’s Director-
General Lungisa Fuzile‚ was quoted as saying that the energy ‘war room’ was looking at ways 
to get the private sector involved in Eskom (Creamer 15 May, 2015). This lack of agreement 
reflects Eberhard’s (2005) description of South African electricity policy as being a swing from 
‘state to market and back again’. That government has gone to great lengths to avoid the word 
‘privatisation’ illustrates deep ideological differences within the ANC between those advocating 
for market reform and those for state control. Organised labour in particular is opposed to any 
privatisation of Eskom, since they see electricity as a public good. In general though, the 
position within the government and the ANC is contradictory.  
A key question remains, however, whether there would be sufficient interest from investors in 
light of the utility’s negative credit rating, soaring tariffs and the fact that a number of the power 
stations are in need of maintenance. For instance, a member of the regulator indicated that it 
would be very difficult to find investors to purchase Eskom’s assets ‘and the ones you do will 
make you pay for the investment’, due to the fact that Eskom is struggling with old plants and is 
in financial crisis, cautioning that it would be the consumers who would carry the price. How 
the assets would be sold is also unclear. Given Eskom’s poor financial status this is likely to 
inflate investor risk. Therefore the sale ‘needs to be structured in such a way that Eskom does 
not attract additional expenses that investors can create/perceive to be there.... Eskom would 
                                                      
13	  	   Over	  the	  same	  period,	  there	  have	  been	  four	  Ministers	  of	  Energy	  and	  five	  Ministers	  of	  Public	  Enterprises.	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have to look at selling its best assets with above average performance in order to avoid investors 
adding premiums for where they see risk.’  
5. Governing electricity 
5.1 Policy making and institutions: formal and informal 
Though the DoE is responsible for energy policy and planning, in reality formal and informal 
influence over many decisions made in the DoE’s name is exerted and contested by numerous 
entities, as this section now discusses. 
The DPE has had oversight responsibility for Eskom, as for other parastatals, since the late 
1980s14. Nersa, set up under the National Energy Regulator Act (Act 4 of 2004) which provided 
for the establishment of an independent regulator, determines electricity tariffs, sets the 
conditions under which electricity may be sold in the country, approves licences for generation, 
distribution and transmission, and oversees the import, export and trading of electricity (NERA, 
2004). As with the DoE, Nersa also reports to the energy minister. The Treasury meanwhile 
looks at the financial exposures of Eskom. The Energy Act of 2008 and the Electricity 
Regulation Act (ERA) of 2006 each delineate certain powers for the Minister of Energy. Other 
institutions of national electricity governance involved include metropolitan and municipal 
governments, organisations such as Association of Municipal Electricity Utilities and South 
African Local Government Association. 
Weak institutional capacity has inevitably influenced policy-making in the energy sector 
(Newbery & Eberhard, 2008). Moreover, the history of energy governance at a departmental 
level reflects national uncertainty over how it should be implemented. The NGO IDASA (2010: 
4) highlighted ‘a systemic lack of clarity concerning roles and responsibilities in the electricity 
sector, with an associated extended period of policy opaqueness and uncertainty’. It further 
found that ‘a lack of policy coordination has contributed to chronic under-capacitation, 
compounding the complex and profound social and environmental challenges that confront the 
country’. 
In March 1980 the energy function of the then Department of Environmental Planning and 
Energy was moved into the newly formed Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) 
(Fine & Rustomjee, 1996: 97). Almost two decades later, in 2009, following President Jacob 
Zuma’s inauguration, the functions of the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) were 
separated into two departments, the Department of Minerals (DMR) and the Department of 
Energy (DoE). Nearly six years after the DoE was set up, the department is still gaining strength 
and capacity. As one civil society explained ‘The DoE is finding its feet only now’. One of the 
reasons for this can be attributed to the neglect of energy policy by the DME in favour of 
distributing mining rents. As a member of DTI explained (in a 2010 interview, in Baker (2012: 
102)), ‘part of the explanation for the policy vacuum on the energy side was because of the 
overwhelming focus of the DME was on distributing rents in relation to mining licences. They 
had a narrow focus on using mining rents for class formation of a narrow group of black 
capitalists. The distribution of mineral rents enjoyed preeminent focus with a relative neglect of 
other policy imperatives, including the growth of mining employment; safety conditions in 
mining; and energy policy.’ 
While the DoE has developed some energy-planning capabilities and is looking to control 
nuclear procurement, it should be noted that much of the policy success as regards procuring 
privately generated power is actually housed within the IPP Unit (see Section 5.3). Lack of 
expertise, knowledge and an inadequate understanding of the technology have also affected the 
DoE’s ability to govern electricity. For this reason it has been suggested that decision-makers 
                                                      
14 The DPE, as the representative of the sole shareholder, is responsible for appointing Eskom’s board. In more 
recent years, this has led to questions about the choice of board members, several of whom have close ties to 
President Zuma and lacked experience in running an electricity utility. When Eskom board-level conflicts arose, 
Zola Tsotsi, former chairperson went so far as to claim the backing of Zuma (Southall, 2015; Paton, 2015). 
The political economy of decarbonisation: Exploring the dynamics of South Africa’s electricity sector 20 
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE 
within the DoE have been influenced by those advocating for increased coal generation and 
nuclear (Baker, 2012:102). 
The DoE’s formal powers arise from the 2006 Electricity Regulation Act. Under apartheid, 
Eskom was responsible for all planning and new build decisions, but after the 1998 White Paper 
on Energy Policy outlined a planned liberalisation of the sector, this responsibility fell away. It 
was not until the Electricity Regulation Act was promulgated in 2006 that a framework was put 
in place to allocate responsibility for new build in the sector. Under Section 34 of the Electricity 
Regulation Act, the Minister of Energy will determine whether new generation capacity is 
required, and what form of energy source the capacity will use. The right to allocate 
responsibility is further elaborated on through the Electricity Regulations on New Generation 
Capacity (DoE, 2011). These regulations state that, following the development of an Integrated 
Resource Plan, and in line with Section 34 of the Electricity Regulation Act, the Minister shall 
make a determination of the quantity of capacity to be built, and most importantly, by whom the 
capacity may be built (i.e. by Eskom, an IPP or another organ of state). This is the mechanism 
by which the state allocates responsibility for new build options. Capacity is allocated via a 
Ministerial ‘determination’ (Burton et al, 2014). Once a determination has been made to allocate 
capacity to IPPs, the DoE as ‘procurer’ is responsible for developing Requests for Information, 
Request for Proposals, and running the competitive bid process.15 In reality, these actions are 
now run by the IPP Office set up in 2011 with the initial responsibility of managing REIPPPP. 
Eskom, however, remains the buyer of electricity (IPP purchases are passed through under its 
tariff application) and is responsible for grid connection. 
Tensions between and within departments, poor communication, conflicting opinions, lack of 
technical and human capacity, a reluctance to exercise strategic leadership and to be held to 
account were identified as key obstacles to policy- and decision-making on energy and climate, 
as indeed across the economy. While these may be generic features of governance the world 
over, one member of the renewable energy industry claimed: ‘There are so many different 
voices in government. This is not unique to South Africa, just worse.’ In the case of energy in 
particular, the lack of technical understanding of the issues by policy-makers and relevant 
institutions and individuals was also identified as a key constraint to policy-making. For 
instance, a member of the renewable energy industry stated: ‘A rationally driven, 
technologically based, quantifiable studied, modelled energy policy is not in existence in South 
Africa at the moment’. One civil society member referred to ‘a failure to govern’ and stated that 
‘many people in government are behaving as if their role is managing consultants ... rather than 
providing strategic direction and decision-making. They will arbitrate but not take ownership of 
decision’. 
Another government member stated: ‘From the political economy standpoint, the biggest issue 
is disagreement across government, on end goals, who is responsible and the role of various 
processes ... politicians are not willing to act, they don’t understand the policy they are dealing 
with. This has a lot to do with the structure of departments and political culture.’ A further 
aspect of this is related to the relative power of ministers versus bureaucrats in different 
departments. During the post-apartheid transition in the 1990s, apartheid-era bureaucrats 
remained in key positions, fostering tensions and distrust between the ‘old’ bureaucracy and the 
new political dispensation, especially ministers. To some extent this still exists, even though, 
according to one critic ‘there is a technocratic class now that really should have more clout in 
these decisions’ but instead, due to lack of trust, ‘ministers override the director generals and 
bureaucrats of the various departments on technical matters they don’t understand’.  
                                                      
15  According to the Electricity Regulations on New Generating Capacity (DoE, 2011b), the procurer is ‘ the 
person designated by the Minister in terms of Section 34 as being responsible for the preparation, management 
and implementation of the activities related to procurement of new generation capacity under an IPP 
procurement programme including the negotiation of the applicable power purchase agreements, which person 
may or may not be the buyer’. Under the REIPPPP, the DoE is the procurer, but Eskom is the buyer of the 
electricity produced. 
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There are also obvious silos between key departments such as the DPE and the DoE. As recent 
discussions on the privatisation of Eskom have evidenced, it is clear that Treasury, Eskom and 
the DPE disagree over fundamental issues of electricity governance. In principle the aim of the 
War Room, as we discuss in the following section, is to tackle these silos (Creamer 14 May, 
2015). However as one member of civil society explained ‘people are not working from the 
same databases and assumptions…. There is a lack of a clear coherent vision.’ 
Decision-making on climate change was identified as a particular sticking point. As one 
government member explained, ‘the DTI and the Economic Development Department do not 
have people who work on the environment. And the DEA doesn’t have contacts in the 
economy’. A lack of leadership within the DEA was also referred to. For these reasons 
explained a member of civil society, ‘DEA is not strong enough to stand up to business and they 
lack support from other departments such as the DoE’ and therefore ends up ‘pushing through 
things that are not politically and economically feasible’. However, it was also felt that the DEA 
often failed to ask members of the public and civil society to stakeholder events who in 
principle could be a part of their alliance against business.  
5.2 Independent System Market Operator 
The DoE in 2011 tabled the Independent System Market Operator Bill to Parliament. The bill, 
which followed an announcement from Zuma in 2010 that a transmission company (Transco) 
would be established, was later withdrawn from Parliament and was never re-tabled. In early 
2015 the ANC’s Lekgotla scrapped the idea, though there are rumours that this was related to a 
factional dispute rather than an ideological commitment to retaining the current market structure 
(Paton 12 February, 2015). The bill represented a significant move towards limiting Eskom’s 
powers over the grid and transmission system. It proposed that these functions would remain 
state-owned, but would be separated from Eskom generation and distribution, with a view to 
providing non-discriminatory access to the grid for private generators as per the 1998 White 
Paper on Energy Policy. 
Eskom opposed the bill, claiming that separating its transmission assets would alter its debt-
raising abilities and that, given the supply side crisis facing the country, any large institutional 
changes could adversely affect electricity supply. Civil society and unions similarly opposed the 
bill because they viewed it as a further step towards privatisation of the electricity supply 
industry, to which they remain vehemently opposed (see Steyn 2013 for a review of comments 
submitted on the bill). 
However, Eskom’s internal structure (and control of the grid, its role in planning and as buyer 
of electricity) has come with significant barriers to entry for new players. Not only is Eskom 
able to prioritise grid expenditure (or expenditure on its own generation capacity instead of grid 
infrastructure), but its financial crisis has limited the investments it is making in grid 
strengthening and expansion, which are necessary conditions for an increasingly decentralised 
grid. Even as IPPs undertake self-build of their grid connections, they are constrained by 
Eskom’s lack of funding for large-scale transmission investment. 
5.3 The War Room 
The War Room was set up by The Presidency in December 2014 to deal with South Africa’s 
electricity crisis and in the process ensure coordination between the Departments of Public 
Enterprises, Energy, National Treasury, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 
Economic Development, Mineral Resources and Trade and Industry. Structurally the War Room 
falls under Cabinet’s Inter-Ministerial Committee on Energy, which is chaired by Deputy 
President Cyril Ramaphosa. He in turn is advised by a six-person panel comprising high-level 
academics, finance, and business.16 The War Room is co-chaired by Energy Minister Tina 
Joemat-Pettersson and Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown. Information about the War 
Room and how it makes decisions is, however, scarce. While in principle it is a government 
                                                      
16 Anton Eberhard, Dolly Mokgatle, Sy Gourah, Smunda Mokoena, Derick Elbrecht and Bobby Godsell (Creamer, 
18 June 2015). 
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structure, and for this reason non-government members are not included, it does engage 
regularly with various stakeholders such as Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) and AMEU 
(Creamer 18 June, 2015b). That said it is understood that the renewable energy sector, in 
addition to unions and civil society have not been included in the discussion. Critic Saliem Fakir 
has described it as ‘unimaginative in the way that it is dealing with the crisis’, particularly for its 
failure to consider more decentralised energy solutions (Fakir, 2015).  
5.4 IPP Unit 
Given the DoE’s lack of capacity to manage a renewable energy procurement programme, the 
IPP unit was set up with assistance from the National Treasury’s Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) unit as well as inputs from international and national technical advisors (Eberhard et al, 
2014: 9). The IPP unit was originally set up with a small team of staff from the DoE and PPP 
unit which ‘functioned effectively outside of the formal departmental structure of national 
government’. The unit has maintained credibility as a high quality, transparent and secure 
professional body and, according to Eberhard et al (2014: 9), ‘did not start out with the level of 
mistrust of private business that sometimes characterises other government agencies in South 
Africa’.  
Since it was established in 2011, core departmental responsibilities as regards privately 
generated power are increasingly falling under its remit. The office has now expanded to 70 
staff, and is managing processes for all new privately generated technologies, including coal, 
gas, cogeneration and the potential import of hydro electricity from the Grand Inga Dam in 
DRC. Moreover there were suggestions by a few interviewees that the IPP unit and Eskom’s 
Systems Operator could together form some variation of an independent systems and market 
operator or a new market structure. What this implies for the future institutional management of 
independent power and the design of the electricity supply industry more broadly is significant 
yet unclear.  
There are also concerns as to how the unit does or does not relate to other government 
departments. Firstly, there are coalitions of interests forming around the IPP unit who do not 
consider themselves part of a climate change policy coalition, nor do they seem to have any role 
or interest in supporting the DEA. Secondly, there are suggestions that the IPP unit may be 
overstepping into the mandate of municipalities. This matter relates to broader concerns 
regarding the implementation of requirements for community ownership and economic 
development under REIPPPP and how the overlapping responsibilities of project developers and 
local government should be managed (Wlokas, 2015). As one member of the unit explained, 
‘the IPP office is seen as national government imposing on local government … municipalities 
are saying that the private sector must not spend money on the integrated development plan as it 
makes them look bad’. This arguably points to the need for more coordination between the unit 
and local government. 
5.5 Energy coalitions and transformative alliances 
Outside of government, influential stakeholders in South Africa’s electricity sector include the 
Chamber of Mines, the Energy Intensive User Group (EIUG), and BUSA. The former 
represents the interests of most major mining houses covering all commodities in South Africa 
and is the mining industry’s chief umbrella organisation. The EIUG has a membership of 31 
companies that includes the largest electricity consumers and the country’s five main coal 
miners. Such companies have ‘enormous collective bargaining power’ (Nakhooda, 2011: 21). 
BUSA is the mandated body responsible for representing business to government, and has a 
focused energy and climate change convenor who co-ordinates BUSA’s position on energy and 
climate change policy.  
The influence of such entities is rarely public, however, as the apartheid era legacy of a ‘culture 
of secrecy’ continues to impact policy-making (Marquard, 2006). Unions also have leverage 
over issues of energy policy though are not always representative of organised labour. The 
formal avenue for labour, civil society and business to engage with the state is through the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), though its Energy Task 
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Team is now defunct. Much engagement therefore happens through bilateral or private 
meetings, state-driven processes, ad-hoc fora or through Parliamentary hearings.  
A number of potentially transformative alliances have emerged in South Africa in recent years 
that may assist with the realisation of decarbonisation of the electricity sector. These include the 
South African Wind Energy Association (SAWEA); the South African Photovoltaic Industry 
Association (SAPVIA); the South African Solar Thermal and Electricity Association 
(SASTELA); and the South African Renewable Energy Council (SAREC). As a member of 
SAWEA explained, ‘in terms of coalitions we have gone from SAWEA/SAPVIA/SASTELA to 
SAREC and also have links at the IPP level’. The extent to which such institutions may 
challenge vested interests in the coal-based, energy-intensive economy and current political and 
economic power structures is as yet uncertain. To date, their lobbying power and access to and 
influence over state entities does not match that of historic alliances in the minerals-energy 
complex, as exemplified by the EIUG and BUSA. This is likely a reflection of the fact that the 
industry is young and, in capital terms, much smaller than its carbon-heavy counterparts.  
What is notable, however, is that recent developments have seen renewable energy coalitions 
entering into negotiations with EIUG and the South African Independent Power Producers’ 
Association (SAIPPA) which largely represents the interests of independent coal. These 
tentative alliances appear in part to have been facilitated by the setting up of the War Room as 
discussed above, which, as a member of SAWEA explained ‘has made it easier to get things 
over the line. It has put core decision-makers in one place.’ Consequently ‘we have become 
much closer to the EIUG. The moment that they came to our offices was symbolically a 
watershed moment. They have changed their thinking for sure. Not all of them but it’s an on-
going process.’ In a further development, the renewable energy industry is also considering 
selling electricity direct to industry and has been in discussions with the EIUG over charges for 
wheeling electricity. 
The ability of renewable energy coalitions to participate in the War Room has not, however, 
always been straightforward; rather, ‘renewables get in the back door through the BUSA 
delegation’ rather than having a seat in their own right. Informal avenues and relationships 
rather than institutional structures clearly play a fundamental role in terms of access to decision 
makers, particularly from the perspective of the renewable energy industry, as SAWEA 
explained: ‘It does depend on who knows who and if a car runs someone over everything 
changes. If you get to one critical person you can change everything, but it would better if this 
could be institutionalised.’  
Civil society meanwhile tends not to be interested in advocating for the business models based 
on electricity liberalisation espoused by the renewable energy industry. Similarly, while unions 
may be in favour of renewable energy in theory, they are sceptical about the way in which it is 
being implemented which they see as excessively motivated by profit (Cosatu, 2012). In 
addition, knowledge and drive which can be found among the rank and file union members has 
not necessarily filtered upwards into broader policy support or political salience within the 
alliance.  
While there is an ideological spectrum across South African society, for instance those who 
focus on the poverty-related impacts of climate change (Oxfam) and those that take positions 
based on environmental justice (groundwork), all draw to some extent on economic arguments 
or arguments of justice, since in the South African political space this is so crucial to obtaining 
grassroots support or maintaining legitimacy. There are many active organisations in the 
energy/climate change policy space, some linked to international groups such as WWF, Oxfam 
and Greenpeace. There is a South African Climate Action Now network and civil society meet 
to build consensus on climate policy (e.g. on the INDCs and South Africa’s negotiating 
position; this is coordinated by Project 90x2030). More left-wing groups that oppose coal (and 
often the MEC and capitalism more broadly), such as Earthlife Africa and groundWork (also the 
South African branch of Friends of the Earth), while supportive of renewable energy, are 
concerned for an environmental transition that is echoed in a more radical social transformation. 
Cosatu’s climate change policy similarly uses the notion of an environmental justice and a just 
transition; union representatives are connected to labour and environmental academics at the 
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Society, Work and Development Institute at the University of the Witwatersrand and the unions 
work on certain issues with civil society groupings. Although ideologically diverse, civil society 
in general is often excluded from policy processes because of the bilateral and ad-hoc way in 
which the state engages with business interests. Civil society occupies a spectrum on the 
political space, and also to the degree to which they engage on the technical, rather than 
economic and political aspects of policy processes. But the climate change focus is often 
embedded in broader socio-political struggles and organisations are connected to left-wing 
academics and other groups working on gender, health, water and other issues. This may 
explain why a broader political alliance with the renewable energy industry has not developed.  
Civil society is increasingly using the judiciary to oppose certain administrative decisions, 
working with organisations such as the Legal Resources Centre or the Centre for Environmental 
Rights to bring to the courts cases on air quality/coal plants and the nuclear procurement 
process.  
6. Integrated Resource Plan 
South Africa’s Integrated Resource Plan for electricity, of which a second version was approved 
in May 2011, is a capacity expansion plan covering total demand requirements for electricity 
from 2010 to 2030. The IRP is meant to be a subset of the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) required 
under the National Energy Act 2008 which is to cover all energy sources. However, while the 
IEP was to have been completed by 2012, it has yet to be approved by Cabinet. According to 
the Minister of Energy’s May 2015 budget speech: ‘Our government’s urgent response to load 
shedding has accelerated the finalisation of the much awaited Integrated Energy Plan. Once 
approved by Cabinet, the Integrated Energy Plan will be published as a policy document. This 
Plan will inform our future energy mix and prioritize policy interventions for future 
programmes within the energy sector’ (DoE, 2015). 
As previously discussed in Section 5, there has been an ongoing struggle to establish capacity 
and powers of independent regulation in South Africa. After the 1998 White Paper, DME took 
responsibility for preparing National Integrated Resource Plans (NIRPs), although this was 
outsourced to the National Energy Regulator. NIRP1 and NIRP2 were published in 2001 and 
2004 respectively, but NIRP3 was not completed and the impact of the NIRP processes seemed 
minimal. Eskom had its own internal Integrated Strategic Electricity Planning process, which 
appeared to prevail, and resisted the idea of making this planning information public on the 
grounds of commercial confidentiality. 
The Electricity Regulation Act (Act 4 of 2006) established the necessary powers for the DoE to 
conduct an open IRP process. This process would contain a generation capacity expansion plan 
under which technologies would be legally determined and for which Nersa would grant 
licences. IRP is, therefore, a significant landmark in South Africa’s energy planning and 
therefore any potential transition to decarbonisation. According to one energy analyst, ‘it 
represents a move from back-room decision making with minimal transparency into open 
planning processes with stakeholder engagement’. Even so, by 2009 transparent planning had 
not been established and the first IRP, IRP1, was published without consultation and un-
announced on 31 December 2009 in the middle of the holiday season with a month to comment. 
It was just three pages long and covered the period 2010 to 2013. 
Following IRP 1, the ‘policy-adjusted IRP’, or IRP 2010 to cover the period 2010–2030 was 
promulgated in March 2011 (DoE, 2011). This followed a prolonged and intense stakeholder 
engagement process throughout 2010, with the plan’s initial ‘gazetting date’ of September 2010 
extended into 2011. IRP 2010 includes a cap on CO2 emissions and plans to include some 17 
GW of renewable energy that will deliver 9% of supply by 2030, largely from wind, solar PV 
and CSP. The plan claimed to be consistent with an emission constraint of 275 million tonnes of 
carbon dioxide annually after 2024 (DoE, 2011: 6). Despite this, coal is still set to dominate the 
overall generation mix (DoE, 2013). A project must align with the technological allocations set 
by the IRP in order for the Regulator to be able to grant it a licence (Pienaar & Nakhooda, 
2010). However, according to the latest new generation regulations for electricity, the Minister 
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of Energy holds the right to approve further technological determinations if s/he deems fit. This 
has been used subsequently to add capacity for procurement by the IPP unit 
The negotiation of IRP 2010 took place throughout 2010 and early 2011 as part of a stakeholder 
engagement process that included representatives of the coal, renewable, and nuclear industries; 
the country’s energy-intensive users; financial stakeholders; civil society and academics. Other 
government departments were also involved, with the DEA playing an important role in 
mitigation in the IRP through promoting renewable energy. According to a bilateral donor (in 
Baker, 2012: 102) ‘the DEA has taken the lead on a lot of projects. [In 2010] one of their 
members pushed heavily for the renewables component in the IRP.’  
In light of the DoE’s lack of capacity, the IRP was put together by Eskom’s Systems Operator 
with inputs from a technical task team that consisted largely of members of government, 
Eskom, coal companies and energy-intensive users (Baker et al, 2014). Government was heavily 
criticised on a number of counts, including: the rushed nature of the plan’s negotiation process; 
the lack of transparency of critical assumptions; problems with the plan’s methodology and 
input parameters; costs; the continued dominance of coal; and the potential impacts of the plan 
on the poor. Despite this, many stakeholders considered it a significant advance on previous 
electricity planning processes (Hughes, 2010; Mainstream Renewable Power, 2010). Nakhooda 
(2011) argued that, while the process was dominated by relatively specialised stakeholders able 
to engage with the inevitable technical complexity of electricity planning, opening it up to 
public participation still set an important precedent. One energy analyst added that ‘it was the 
first time in South African history that a plan was formulated in a public negotiation process 
that was extended in response to intense engagement, even though it is probably still biased 
towards supply-side planning and legacy technology’. 
In 2013 a revised IRP was put out for public comment in keeping with the expectation that the 
IRP be updated on a biennial basis (DoE, 2011: 7). However, it is yet to be approved by Cabinet 
and approval is looking less and less likely. Many commentators assume this is because it 
challenges the necessity of the proposed 9.6 GW nuclear fleet in light of lower demand 
projections and relative costs of technologies. Instead, the update proposes a downward 
adjustment in the demand forecast by 6600 MW in light of the drop in economic growth since 
the promulgation of IRP 2010, reductions in energy intensity, Eskom buy-backs (i.e payments 
to large users to cease production), enhanced energy efficiency and some suppressed demand. It 
proposes to reduce allocations for new coal (from 6250 MW to 2450 MW) and wind (from 9200 
MW to 4360 MW) and increase contributions from solar PV (from 8400 MW to 9770 MW) and 
CSP (from 1200 to 3000 MW). It also discusses the potential for an increased role for gas, 
including resources from the region and shale gas. It also states that ‘the revised demand 
projections suggest that no new nuclear baseload capacity is required until after 2025 (and for 
lower demand not until at earliest 2035)’ (DoE, 2013: 8). The draft also states that rather than 
the ‘fixed capacity plan’ espoused by the IRP 2010, ‘flexibility in decisions should be the 
priority to favour decisions of least regret’ and therefore ‘commitments to long range large-scale 
investment decisions should be avoided’ (DoE, 2013: 9). Many of the findings of the IRP’s 
2013 revision, particularly with regards to the anticipated demand growth and assumptions over 
the need for nuclear energy, are in keeping with a study commissioned by the National Planning 
Commission, which states that many of the IRP 2010’s assumptions are out of date and no 
longer valid (ERC, 2013: 3).  
Reactions to the plan were mixed. According to the wind industry, the IRP draft was based on 
‘old and false assumptions’ which did not reflect REIPPPP price decreases, especially 
assumptions on technology costs. Despite such criticisms levelled at the IRP draft, others argue 
that the main reason that it is unlikely to be approved is due to its lack of transparency, which 
undermines the legitimacy of politically driven nuclear procurement. ‘The whole approach of 
putting in decision points in the revised IRP is sensible but too transparent for our government. 
It removes the arbitrage available to our DoE officials’, said one member of civil society. An 
industry member stated: ‘The presidential ambitions for nuclear power didn’t match the official 
policies. If they publish those policies then there is a strong case that the procurement of nuclear 
power will be illegal. So you kill the policy.’ Probably for this reason, the status of this revised 
draft is highly uncertain. One person interviewed suggested that the country has since reverted 
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back to the original document with another predicted for 2015. As one Eskom employee stated, 
‘no one seems to recognise the 2013 version’. It is anticipated that a new version of the IRP will 
be published by March 2016 and will contain a higher allocation for nuclear energy than the 9.6 
GW thus far included (Paton 02 September, 2015). 
As a planning process for electricity, IRP is significant. However, since the initial relative 
success of the IRP 2010-2030, its enabling impact on the REIPPPP and potential moves to 
decarbonisation recent events indicate a return to less open planning processes, as we discuss 
below. Recent developments in the IRP appear to provide evidence of a closing down of open-
consultative planning. 
In terms of climate change mitigation, the update retained the carbon trajectory of the original 
IRP policy-adjusted scenario of 275 Mt to 2030. While the inclusion of any carbon constraint in 
the IRP 2010 was profound, given the history of electricity planning in South Africa, a longer-
term trajectory (as in the update) needs to be formally adopted in line with South Africa’s 
domestic policy and international commitments on climate change mitigation.  
The IRP 2010 assumed the electricity sector would account for 50% of national emissions to 
2030, an assumption for which it was later criticised (electricity sector emission accounted for 
45% of total emissions in 2010) (DEA, 2014). In the policy-adjusted scenario, emissions peak at 
304 Mt CO2-eq and then decline to 275 Mt, roughly in line with the upper end of South Africa’s 
‘peak, plateau and decline’ trajectory, which had not yet been formalised in policy when the IRP 
was released. Since significant coal-fired capacity will be retired in the 2030s, the mitigation 
and supply options after this date are important. Decarbonisation will require significantly 
scaling up of low-carbon options. The IRP update therefore provides a longer run view on the 
technology shift required for mitigation in the electricity sector. Total emissions in 2010 were 
518 Mt CO2-eq. Of this, energy emissions accounted for 428 Mt, and the electricity sector for 
62.5% of energy emissions, or 237 Mt CO2-eq. The IRP therefore assumes an absolute growth 
in emissions until at least 2030. This echoes South Africa’s national policy which is a reduction 
against a business as usual trajectory until 2035, when emissions start to decline in absolute 
terms.  
Beyond 2030, three options were explored in the IRP update (Figure 5): retaining the constant 
emissions trajectory of 275 Mt; a moderate decline scenario where emissions decline from 2037 
onwards to 210Mt CO2-eq in 2050; an advanced decline scenario where emissions decline from 
275 Mt in 2030 and reach 140Mt in 2050. Assuming electricity maintains a 45% share of 
national emissions, the moderate decline is slightly above the DEA’s PPD upper range, while 
the advanced decline trajectory is somewhat higher than the 95 Mtpa allocated to the electricity 
sector for the lower PPD. That is, both trajectories allocate the electricity sector more than 45% 
of national emissions in 2050 – or assume the rest of the economy contributes more to 
mitigation so as to meet national benchmark range for emissions.  
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 Figure 5: Comparison of emissions trajectories for the electricity sector for IRP 2010 update  
(DoE, 2013: 27) 
If a carbon budget approach is used, the IRP update found that mitigation would be pushed 
further into the future, with a more severe decline in the 2040s. Again, however, the assumption 
is that the electricity sector’s proportional allocation of the remaining carbon space is static, 
while Altieri et al (2015) found that decarbonising the electricity sector is an important supply-
side option to reduce emissions and meet a carbon constraint for the energy sector as a whole. 
The IRP is limited in its analysis because it cannot capture inter-sectoral costs and benefits or 
substitutions between different carriers. This is the remit of the Integrated Energy Plan which 
has not yet been released, despite a legal requirement under the 2008 Energy Act for it to be 
updated annually.  
Given the importance of the electricity sector to absolute emissions, there are also 
inconsistencies between other aspects of climate policy and a regulated procurement process 
and tariff in the electricity sector (Tyler & Cloete, 2014). Electricity users are locked in to 
electricity related emissions that are set through the DoE’s allocation of new build based on the 
IRP. The IRP carbon constraint is therefore key to decarbonisation, yet the IRP assumes a 
certain share of carbon space.  
While the IRP 2010 process was an improvement on previous electricity planning processes that 
took place inside of Eskom and without any public participation, aspects of the legislative and 
regulatory regime that remain highly concentrated in ministerial discretion, relatively closed off 
to the public, and continue the apartheid-era secrecy in the energy sector still remain. The IRP 
remains key to decarbonisation in South Africa, yet none of its scenarios examine the 
implications of fully decarbonising the sector. Without an Integrated Energy Plan, the relative 
costs of decarbonising the energy sector cannot be compared, and electricity infrastructure is 
being procured on the basis of an assumed share of carbon space for the electricity sector. 
7. Renewable energy independent power producers’ 
procurement programme 
The Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) was 
launched in 2011 having been initiated as a renewable energy feed-in tariff (REFIT) in 2007 by 
individuals within Nersa’s electricity regulatory division with the support of inter-alia, bilateral 
donors, renewable energy companies, banks and investors. The prolonged consultation process 
was subject to delays and disagreements over issues that included how risk should be allocated 
between government and developers, how the tariff levels should be set, and who the buyer of 
power would be in light of uncertainty over the ISMO bill, discussed in Section 5.2 (Baker 
2012). The consultation process to establish what at the time was still REFIT was also 
accompanied by mistrust of renewable energy within some factions of government and industry. 
Despite this and the on-going uncertainty over the policy and regulatory framework, by late 
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2010 the process had attracted significant attention from international investors and technology 
suppliers. Subsequently in May 2011, the DoE made changes to the 2009 Electricity 
Regulations on New Generation Capacity (see Section 5.1) which effectively transferred powers 
over the procurement process away from Nersa to the DoE and National Treasury. This move 
also facilitated the shift from a feed-in tariff to a competitive bidding system under RE IPPPP 
and followed a declaration by Treasury that REFIT was in violation of national procurement 
legislation. RE IPPPP was eventually launched in August 2011 and managed and implemented 
by the IPP unit as discussed in Section 5.4.  
In addition to the establishment of a national regulatory framework, a further reason for the 
success of RE IPPPP was due to intense interest from international renewable energy developers 
and technology suppliers who, following the global financial crisis in 2008 which had reduced 
opportunities in Europe and US, were seeking new markets. RE IPPPP has generated significant 
momentum since its launch in 2011 and has been celebrated nationally and internationally for 
its open and transparent bidding processes, low tariffs and for the successful procurement of 
privately generated power after several decades of thwarted attempts. The nature of its 
development, and some of the stakeholders involved has been well documented by a number of 
authors (Eberhard et al, 2014; Baker and Wlokas, 2015; Pegels, 2011).  
At the time of writing, RE IPPPP has resulted in the approval of just over 6327 MW GW of 
utility-scale renewable energy under four bidding rounds. Of this, 53% is for wind, 36% for 
solar PV and 10% for CSP. A total of 92 projects have been approved, for which a combined 
investment value of R192-billion (approximately $14 billion) has been committed. Forty two 
projects totalling 2142 MW were connected to the grid by October 2015. Successful projects 
sell to Eskom’s grid under a 20-year, local currency-denominated, government-backed power 
purchase agreement (PPA). 
At its launch in August 2011, REIPPPP had an initial allocation of 3725 MW to be allocated 
under five bidding rounds. An additional 3200 MW of capacity was later declared by the 
Minister of Energy in December 2012. On 18 August 2015 a new ministerial determination 
allowed for the procurement of a further 6300 MW. This announcement has been welcomed by 
prospective bidders and investors for providing greater certainty to the industry. A submission 
date for an ‘expedited’ round to absorb 1800 MW of projects that failed marginally in previous 
windows was set for 1 October 2015 and then postponed until November 2015. This 1800 MW 
is included in the additional 6300 MW announced in August. Beyond this, it is anticipated that a 
new tender framework for round five and beyond will then be introduced.  
The programme has further been celebrated for the savings it has created for the South African 
economy. According to the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR, 2015), solar 
and wind projects collectively generated a R8.3 billion benefit in the first six months of 2015. 
This is firstly through savings in diesel and coal fuel costs, to a total of R3.6 billion replaced by 
solar and wind energy, and secondly through savings to the economy by avoiding load shedding 
or ‘unserved energy’. This has been calculated through a methodology developed by the CSIR’s 
energy centre which determines whether, at any given hour of the year, renewables have 
replaced coal or diesel generators, or whether they have even prevented ‘unserved 
energy’(Steyn, 2015). 
REIPPPP has also been praised for its progressive requirements for community ownership and 
economic development. Specifically, under REIPPPP projects bid are assessed 70% on price 
below a certain tariff, which decreases with each round (see Table 3) and 30% on economic 
development criteria which include factors such as job creation, participation of historically 
disadvantaged individuals, protection of local content, rural development, community 
ownership, and skills development (Baker & Wlokas, 2015). A project’s tariff submission will 
be invalid without also meeting the economic development criteria and so successful bids are 
the ones that meet these criteria at the lowest tariff. However, tensions have been identified 
between REIPPPP’s potentially transformative requirements for economic development and 
community ownership on the one hand, and commercial priorities for ‘bankability’, the 
minimisation of risk and short-term, profit-driven interests on the other. Whether these tensions 
can be successfully managed will determine the long-term success of the industry and the extent 
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to which it will result in sustainable social, economic and environmental benefits beyond the 
generation of renewable electricity (Baker, 2015; Wlokas, 2015). 
As previously discussed, even with additional requirements which add costs for the developer, 
the dramatic decrease in the tariffs bid by project developers under REIPPPP are now cost-
competitive, if not lower than new build coal under Eskom. This has provided strong arguments 
in favour of an increased renewable energy allocation and is an important consideration for the 
decarbonisation of South Africa’s electricity sector. On the flip side however, these low tariffs 
have also been identified as a risk to the project’s ‘bankability’. Notably, there are questions as 
to how sustainable these tariffs are, given that projects are now operating on very tight 
contingencies. As one member of the finance industry explained, ‘no one wants projects that 
can’t close, can’t be built and can’t produce’.  
A further concern relates to the high transaction and financial costs involved in bid preparation 
and the significant though undetermined amounts that will have been lost in making successful 
projects ‘bid ready’. These amounts have been compounded by the six-month delay in the 
announcement of the successful winners of round four, largely due to issues of grid connection 
as discussed in Section 7.2. While this is a risk that is carried by the private sector rather than 
Eskom, inevitably these costs will be structured into any successful project.  
7.1 A new industry 
The renewable energy industry under development in South Africa involves globalised 
networks of developers; engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) companies; 
technology suppliers; and flows of national and international investment. Limited companies or 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) are set up with the sole purpose of developing, operating and 
owning the actual project. As part of REIPPPP’s ownership criteria these companies must have 
a minimum of: 40% South African shareholding, 12% BEE shareholding with a target of 20%; 
and 2.5% community ownership within a 50 km radius of the project. As previously 
documented (Baker and Wlokas, 2015), despite these criteria for national ownership and local 
content, a key concern is that the growing industry has rapidly fallen under the domain of 
international companies who dominate at the level of project development; engineering, 
construction and procurement; and technology supply. This has led to concerns that 
opportunities for small and medium enterprises to involve themselves in the renewable energy 
industry and supply chain is limited. The predominance of foreign ownership has further led to 
concerns that financial returns are more likely to leave the country rather than being invested 
nationally.  
Players that dominate as lead developers within the project company include Ireland’s 
Mainstream Renewable Power and China Longyuan Power in the wind industry; Italy’s Enel 
Green Power in both solar PV and wind; Sun Edison (US) and Scatec Solar (Norway) in solar 
PV; and Spain’s Abengoa in Solar PV. The structure of project ownership is complex and hard 
to track, more so because international shareholdings are likely to change hands following the 
rule that equity can be on sold after three years of project operation. BEE and community 
shareholders meanwhile will struggle to on-sell given that projects must maintain a minimum 
BEE shareholding of 12% and a minimum community shareholding of 2.5% in order to meet 
the economic development requirements of REIPPPP, or risk losing its licence (Baker, 2015). 
The range of companies carrying out the EPC contracts for wind energy projects is also 
dominated by global leaders. In the case of wind the EPC contractor is often the same company 
as the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who supplies technology to the projects and in 
many cases holds the contract for operation and maintenance. This illustrates the vertically 
integrated nature of the global wind technology industry and its supply chain. Such companies 
hold the warrantees required by debt financiers and equity investors who seek guarantees and 
international experience in order to reduce risk under the norms of project finance (Baker, 
2015). While European companies, namely Nordex, Siemens and Vestas, still dominate, a 
significant minority of emerging market companies have become involved. These include 
India’s Suzlon and China’s Sinovel in round one of RE IPPPP and China’s Guodian United 
Power in round three (Baker and Wlokas, 2015). In round four, Chinese Goldwind is 
The political economy of decarbonisation: Exploring the dynamics of South Africa’s electricity sector 30 
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE 
undertaking the EPC for two projects being developed by South African company Biotherm 
Energy.  
The EPC for solar PV is dominated by European companies such as Enertronica, ABB and 
Juwi. Unlike the wind industry, the EPC for solar PV is less often involved in technology 
supply given the more dispersed nature of the supply chain and the components involved e.g 
panels, frames, inverters, transformers, tracking system, cable trays, cells, glass. However, 
Chinese companies play a significant role technology supply, reflecting their role as the world’s 
largest manufacturers of solar PV technology since 2008, having overtaken Germany which was 
the original market leader (Dunford et al, 2013:30). There is greater potential for innovation in 
solar PV than wind, given that the latter is more mature as a technology and therefore harder to 
break into (Rennkamp and Boyd 2013:12). There is less information in the public domain 
relating to CSP, however Spain’s Abengoa and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power are lead players. 
7.2 Financing renewables  
The majority of REIPPPP projects have been project-financed. Project finance is a mechanism 
for long-term, capital-intensive financing for privately generated energy projects (Yescombe 
2013), as compared to the financing of a state-owned utility using public sector debt as has been 
the case with Eskom. In renewable energy, project financing is generally structured on the basis 
of a 70:30 debt to equity ratio of the capital cost of the project (Mendonça et al, 2010:24) 
though in South Africa’s case this is sometimes up to 80:20. The higher debt levels, the lower 
the average cost of funding of the project will be. Debt providers, or lenders provide finance-
based debt on fixed-loan terms and will not take liability for any potential project losses. 
Therefore the key priority of lenders is to minimise risk before agreeing to lend, as for instance 
has been witnessed through a requirement for internationally experienced contractors and 
technological guarantees (Baker & Wlokas, 2015). In rounds one and two, the majority 
providers of debt financing were South Africa’s four biggest commercial banks, Standard Bank, 
Nedbank, ABSA Capital and First Rand Bank, as well as financial services group Investec, 
providing a total of R57 billion (Eberhard et al, 2014:1). Lenders are in first receipt of the 
financial revenues generated by the project which means that returns for equity investors or 
project sponsors are more dependent on the project’s successful generation of a return (Eberhard 
et al, 2014:13). Equity investors carry the greatest risk for which they expect to generate a 
higher return (Baker 2015).  
Other lenders include development finance institutions such as the World Bank’s International 
Finance Corporation and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the 
European Investment Bank who have provided debt to a small number of projects, usually to 
‘unproven’ technology, i.e. CSP, and always in partnership with other lenders; export credit 
agencies; insurance funds and in some cases, the project developer. Rounds three and four saw a 
shift to some projects being financed off balance sheet which has reduced the role for some of 
South Africa’s banks and their influence over the nature of the project. 
As discussed in Section 3, South Africa’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has also 
played a major role in RE IPPPP project finance in the capacity of a debt financier, an equity 
investor and in providing finance to BEE companies and community trusts so that they can pay 
for their share of equity. Of the R13.2 billion the IDC provided in rounds one to three, R2.7-
billion of this was for community participation (IDC, 2014). The Development Bank of South 
Africa (DBSA) has also played a similar though lesser role. 
Table 3: REIPPPP prices by technology and bid round, (per kWh; April 2011 rand) 
(CSIR, 2015; DoE, 2015c) 
Tariffs Round 1 
bid cap 
Round 1 
average bid 
Round 2 
average bid 
Round 3 
average bid 
Round 4  
average bid  
Wind R1.15 R 1.36 R 1.07 R 0.78 R0.62 
Solar PV R2.85 R 3.29 R 1.97 R 1.05 R0.79 
CSP R2.85 R 2.69 R 2.51 R 1.46  
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7.3 Renewable energy innovation 
While REIPPPP has been deemed an unprecedented success in terms of investment and the 
rapid construction of renewable energy, questions have been raised over the long-term impact of 
its economic development criteria, including local content. Such criteria relate to government 
commitments to the green economy and a labour-intensive industrialisation path.  
Local content thresholds and targets under REIPPPP have increased with each bidding round, 
for which reason a number of manufacturing and assembly plants for low technology 
components, including towers for wind and solar PV modules and inverters, have been set up or 
are under development. However, it has been argued that the limited market size created by 
REIPPPP will be inadequate to generate local production and that the technological upgrade and 
job creation impacts have remained at the lower- and medium-technology levels (Rennkamp & 
Westin, 2013). This echoes Bell and Albu’s (1999) assertion that local content requirements 
alone are more likely to benefit short-term activities in construction rather than a long-term local 
manufacturing industry with high levels of domestic ownership and ‘technological capabilities’.  
Given that South Africa does not have a well-established industry for the manufacture of 
renewable energy equipment (Ahlfeldt, 2013:xiv), or indeed manufacturing more generally 
(Bhorat et al, 2014), in global terms it is behind the curve. The wind and solar PV industries 
involve trajectories of increasingly complex technology and are more knowledge- than labour-
intensive (Olsen, 2012:138). They also require semi- to highly-qualified skills rather than blue 
collar/artisan level, and often internationally mobile labour. These factors will evidently 
challenge the extent to which the South African government will be able to set up a local 
manufacturing industry and develop innovative capabilities, despite its commitments to 
localisation and the green economy. 
National commitments to the green economy are important to South Africa’s policy context and 
are included in various national plans and documents on growth and industrial policy. 
Significantly, the Green Economy Accord, published by the Department for Economic 
Development and one of the six priorities of the New Growth Path was signed in November 
2011 in time for the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Durban by representatives of 
government, business, organised labour and a small number of ‘community constituents’. The 
Accord has a target of 300 000 new jobs through green investments by 2020, of which 50 000 in 
the renewable energy sector (EDD, 2011:19), though it is unknown how these figures were 
calculated (Musango et al, 2014:11). Secondly, the 2013–2016 Industrial Policy Action Plan 
(IPAP 2) proposes to revise REIPPPP’s local content requirements in order to achieve an 
‘increased local content threshold for renewable energy projects in line with the development of 
a competitive local renewable energy manufacturing industry’ (DTI, 2013:122). The National 
Development Plan also highlights the need to development the renewable energy sector 
(National Planning Commission, 2013). A number of educational initiatives have also been set 
up for the creation of ‘green technical skills’, including at various technical colleges across the 
country as well as the establishment of the South African Renewable Energy Technology Centre 
in the Western Cape.  
Studies on localisation of the wind (DTI, 2015), solar PV (Ahfeldt, 2013) and CSP industries 
(SASTELA, 2013) have been carried out by various different departments and/or donors and the 
private sector. Incentives have also been set up or amended to attract investment and 
manufacturing to South Africa. For example the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act was 
approved in May 2014 in order to strengthen the current Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) 
Act. SEZs are geographically designated areas set aside for specifically targeted economic 
activities identified by the IPAP. Under the act, manufacturing facilities will qualify for various 
financial and other incentives including a reduced corporation tax rate. Of the ten SEZs now 
being set up in South Africa, the Atlantis IDZ in the Western Cape has been designated for 
green technology and currently houses a wind tower facility run by GRI industries; the Coega 
IDZ houses DCD wind towers; and the East London IDZ is home to the solar PV manufacturing 
facility ILB Helios. The aim of an SEZ is to keep as much of the value chain process in one 
place by, for instance, supporting a larger manufacturer that would then allow small, medium 
and micro enterprises and smaller suppliers to input into the value chain e.g through logistics, 
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transport, nuts and bolts, wiring and supply of personal protective equipment. Ideally this will 
create economies of scale in various different industries in order to be able to compete with the 
scale of manufacturing from Asia, particularly China (Baker, forthcoming).  
7.4 Connecting renewable energy 
As discussed in Section 10, the viability of depending on Eskom’s transmission grid to 
incorporate intermittent and/or variable sources17 of generation is becoming a challenge and 
potentially a risk to the future success of renewable energy projects. Not only was the challenge 
of grid integration a key factor in delays to the announcement of winning projects bid under 
round four but also to the realisation of the financial close of round three. This is likely to affect 
projects in future rounds as well. As one member of the renewable energy industry stated, ‘the 
grid is becoming an issue – not a death knell but an issue’. While IPPs pay for the connection of 
their projects, there is a requirement that Eskom strengthen the transmission network and 
upgrade substations to connect projects accordingly. However, Eskom has stated that capital of 
R162 billion to 2024 is required (Eskom, 2015c). In certain areas where proposed sites are 
located, grid access is becoming scarcer. It is anticipated by industry that solar PV and wind 
will start to compete for access to the same line but if the transmission capacity is not available 
then the ability to incorporate further renewable generation sources will plateau. With this in 
mind, members of the finance industry are starting to see the issue as an investment risk, and 
have suggested that it is more financially viable to force the market to bid in regions where 
connections are still available, given the additional costs and time involved in constructing 
transmission and distribution infrastructure. This is supported by Eskom grid planners, who 
argue that project bids should have some spatial component so that successful bidders are 
located in areas with excess substation and grid capacity (Eskom, 2015c, see Section 10). 
A further challenge relates to the ‘budget notes’ that project developers require from Eskom if 
they are to reach financial close, in a move which saw Eskom effectively holding Nersa and the 
renewable energy procurement process hostage. This budget note outlines the costs of 
connecting each project to the grid and is determined by the amount of engineering planning 
that needs to be carried out, depending on the complexities of the project. Eskom has a 
regulatory requirement to produce these notes within six months. However, Eskom requested an 
exemption to providing these notes on the basis that no capital allocation had been allocated for 
Eskom to pay for the electricity from IPPs beyond bid window three under the current multi-
year pricing regime (MYPD3) which runs until 2018 (Slabbert, 2015). The lack of a budget note 
would effectively prevent new projects from becoming commercially operational and 
connecting to the grid in that they cannot reach financial close without it. In addition to investor 
‘risk’ discussed above, this and poses a real threat to the construction of renewable energy going 
forward. It also highlights the pressures placed on Eskom by institutional mismatches, in this 
case between Nersa’s tariff-setting processes, DoE procurement, and Eskom’s role as buyer and 
transmitter of electricity.  
 
                                                      
17 Renewable energy is considered ‘variable’ or ‘intermittent’ because the output from a wind farm varies 
considerably over time, being determined by numerous factors including seasonal variations and site-specific 
factors (Rycroft, 2011; Sinden, 2008). Flexible reserve generation, such as closed cycle gas turbines or pumped 
storage plants in the case of South Africa, is needed in order to manage variability. How much depends on how 
much wind power and how much flexibility already exists in the system, but significant increases in reserve 
generation and/or storage only come into play at energy proportions of non-dispatchable wind and PV power of 
above 10% ( Trollip & Marquard, 2014) Other options for managing variability include the use of ‘smart’ 
meters so that flexible loads (demand) are moved to times when wind power is high, and storing excess energy 
at the site of generation in batteries, hydrogen gas, pumped hydroelectric power or a thermal storage medium 
(Jacobson & Delucchi, 2011:1172). However, the mainstream roll out of these possibilities is some way off 
even in countries with high levels of grid penetration.  
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Figure 6: Map of REIPPPP projects rounds 1–4  
(Forder, 2015; www.energy.org.za) 
8. Embedded generation and rooftop solar PV 
While the country’s renewable energy developments are mainly dominated by REIPPPP, more 
recently a rooftop solar PV programme has been emerging, particularly as a response by 
wealthy consumers and businesses to repeated load shedding. Consequently, in February 2015 
the energy regulator released a consultation paper for small-scale commercial and residential 
embedded generation will allow small-scale solar PV generators to supply electricity to the grid. 
A public consultation was held in April 2015 and it is understood that the regulatory framework 
was meant to be completed by September 2015. The consultation document covered grid 
connection standards, inverter regulations, codes of practice on small-scale embedded 
generators and tariff design (Nersa 2015). Optimistically, it is estimated that rooftop PV will 
reach grid parity in three to four years. The latest draft of the IRP released in 2013 estimates that 
embedded residential and commercial PV has the potential to provide as much as 22.5 GW by 
2030 (DoE, 2013). The creation of a regulatory framework is long overdue given that in its 
absence, many illegal connections of grid-tied rooftop solar PV of between 100 KW and 1 MW 
have already been made. Municipalities and those who have installed grid-tied rooftop solar PV 
units have been ‘making up their own rules’, for which reason industry is asking for this to be 
formalised. As one member of the industry stated in May 2015 ‘government is playing catch up 
on embedded generation’. The South African Solar Photovoltaics Industry Association 
estimates that 31 MWs peak have been installed and it is estimated that only 20% of 
installations less than 10 KW have been reported.  
Unlike coal-fired power or nuclear, solar PV embedded generation units can be installed very 
quickly and some of the electricity generated is consumed on site. One example of this is Black 
River Park in Cape Town which has a generating capacity of 1.2 MW. This is the first project to 
legally transmit electricity back into the City of Cape Town’s electrical distribution network. 
However, in the past there has been resistance to demand-side management by many 
municipalities who use the revenue they gain from selling electricity for other expenditures such 
as healthcare and education. 
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The development of small-scale roof-top solar PV has accelerated in recent months as a solution 
that permits mid-to-high-income domestic and industrial customers to ‘opt out’ of relying on a 
faltering grid and soaring electricity tariffs. The implications of this, however, are that low-
income consumers, unable to afford their own alternatives, may be left behind and forced to 
depend on an increasingly unreliable and expensive coal-fired electricity grid.  
9. Emerging non-renewable independent power 
producers  
The way in which REIPPPP has been and continues to be implemented clearly has implications 
for independent power from other sources including coal, cogeneration and gas. Having 
discussed REIPPPP in Section 7, we now discuss other upcoming programmes for privately 
produced power. A baseload IPP procurement programme (BLIPPPP) was announced via 
ministerial determination in 2012,18 covering gas (2652 MW), coal (2500 MW), and imported 
hydro (2609 MW) (RSA, 2012). The determination was amended in August 2015 to increase 
the capacity allocated to gas to 3126 MW (ie the CCGT and OCGT capacity in the IRP up to 
2025) (RSA, 2015a). The IPP Office has also issued a request for bids for a cogeneration 
programme of 800 MW.  
9.1 Coal 
A request for proposals in relation to 2.5GW of new coal fired generation was released in 
December 2014. The bid submission was initially scheduled for June 2015 but has since been 
extended to November 2015. The first round was to have comprised 1.6GW of new coal-fired 
IPP projects of which 1GW in South Africa and 600 MW in cross-border projects. However, the 
IPP unit later indicated that the 600 MW in cross-border capacity would not be contracted 
during the first round (Creamer 17 September, 2015). Projects under this process will be 600 
MW or smaller and will need to submit bids below a tariff cap of 82c/kWh. Provision has been 
made in the design documents for IPPs to pay the proposed carbon tax (see Section 14). It is 
expected that the preferred bidders will be announced in January 2016 with financial close 
anticipated for mid-2016 (Creamer 17 September, 2015). 
The reason for the extension of the bid submission apparently took place following requests for 
extension from potential bidders. The extension was justified on the basis of the greater 
complexity and size of the coal projects as compared to renewable energy projects under the 
REIPPPP. This complexity includes the need for projects to secure supplies of coal and water 
and obtain environmental authorisation. Requirements for local ownership are also greater than 
those stipulated under REIPPPP; South Africans must own 51% of the project companies, of 
which 30% must be owned by black economic empowerment shareholders. This is in 
comparison to a minimum target of 40% local ownership and a minimum of 12% for black 
ownership under REIPPPP. Projects can be either pulverised fuel or fluidised bed plants, though 
at appears that most potential projects will be fluidised bed technology.  
As in the REIPPPP, there are contractual arrangements for how the electricity generated by IPPs 
will be used by the system operator. In the case of renewable energy, all the electricity 
generated is taken and is paid for. For the BLIPPPP, this has been set at a certain level. This 
raises the potential, once the grid has returned to a better supply and demand situation, of the 
dispatch of newer, potentially more expensive baseload power taking precedence over older, 
typically cheaper, Eskom generating capacity. While this is not an issue given current supply 
constraints, market design or policy will need to evolve to deal with dispatch issues in the 
future. It requires close coordination between the System Operator and the IPP Unit to balance 
the risks for private players versus the system-wide efficiencies of the grid.  
Based on publicly available information at the time of writing, Table 4 gives details of 
companies that have applied for, or obtained, environmental authorisation for coal-fired power 
                                                      
18  Under the Electricity Regulation Act (2006) and the New Generation Regulations, the Minister of Energy must 
‘determine’ (ie allocate) new build capacity to be built and by whom, in consultation with Nersa. 
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stations. Given the challenges of transparency and the early stages of the process, information is 
limited. However, it is significant to note that at least two of the lead owners include players 
also involved in South Africa’s REIPPPP: ACWA power and Engie, formerly GDF Suez (see 
Baker, 2015), although Engie has announced a moratorium on new coal ventures in the run up 
to COP 21 and exited the proposed Thabametsi project. Marubeni Corporation, which has since 
partnered with Exxaro on the project, is also indirectly involved in the REIPPPPP through its 
holdings in Mainstream Renewable Power.  
For some of the proposed projects, the rationale for the coal plant is to support new mining 
ventures or utilise discard coal or product that would be otherwise unsaleable (for example, 
Thabametsi and Umbani). In other cases, the development is also intended to provide energy 
security for large energy-intensive users or for other mining operations (for example, Sibanye 
Gold and the Waterberg station). Khanyisa was initially developed by Anglo American for this 
reason; to provide security of supply for Anglo Platinum whilst utilising Anglo Coal’s discards. 
This latter rationale is justified because the RFP allows for either single-buyer or multi-buyer 
contracts, i.e. projects where Eskom is the sole buyer or where Eskom buys only a portion of the 
plant’s output.  
Table 4: Potential coal IPPS (compiled from EIR and EIA reports) 
Project Location Technology Ownership  Environmental 
authorisation 
Proposed coal 
supply (if available) 
Khanyisa Emalahleni 3x150MW 
circulating 
fluidised bed  
ACWA Power Africa 
Holdings 
Granted Discard 
KiPower Delmas 4x150MW 
circulating 
fluidised bed 
Kuyasa Mining 
through subsidiary 
Kipower Pty Ltd 
Granted  Kuyasa Mining 
Delmas Colliery, via 
conveyor 
Umbani Emalahleni 3x 300MW 
circulating 
fluidised bed 
ISS global mining 
(Pty) Ltd 
 Discard coal from 
Exxaro’s (formerly 
Total Coal South 
Africa) Dorstfontein 
East mine via 
conveyor 
Boikarabelo Waterberg 260MW Resgen Granted Resgen 
Boikarabelo Mine 
Thabametsi Waterberg 2x600MW Formerly Engie with 
Exxaro, now 
Marubeni 
Corporation 
Granted Exxaro’s 
prospective 
Thabametsi mine, 
via conveyor 
Waterberg Lephalale 600MW Waterberg Power 
Company 
(subsidiary of 
Waterberg Coal 
company) 
 Waterberg Coal 
Group mine 
(Firestone Energy 
/Sekoko Resources) 
Colenso KZN 1050MW Colenso Power 
(Pty) Ltd 
 Proposed greenfield 
Colenso project 
 
Although bid submission has not yet been reached and preferred bidder status has not been 
announced, the Eskom Transmission Development Plan (TDP) 2015–2024 already includes four 
coal IPP connections, split evenly between Lephalale and Emalahleni. Eskom transmission 
planning has assumed that the following connections will take place: a 600MW Coal IPP 1 
(Khanyisa) will be connected in 2019; a 750MW Coal IPP 2 (Exxaro project) will be connected 
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in 2022; a 400MW coal IPP 3 in Witbank 2020 and a 4x250MW Coal IPP 4 in Lephalale from 
2022-2024 (Eskom, 2015c). 
This programme not only represents a move away from Eskom by facilitating quicker, more 
dynamic, and less costly sources of coal-fired power, but also represents the first time Eskom is 
facing real competition for its core business – provision of larger-scale dispatchable power. The 
multi-buyer contracts also allow for companies to subvert their reliance on Eskom, which 
retains control of the grid but not necessarily of supply to its key industrial customers.  
From a decarbonisation perspective, the programme will replace retiring Eskom coal-fired 
plants with IPP coal-fired plants and is thus perpetuating the country’s dependence on coal for 
electricity. As discussed above, the carbon constraint in the IRP is set under the assumption that 
the electricity sector does not decarbonise before 2030 (if at all), thus allowing for the 
construction of new coal fired power. Decarbonising electricity, however, is an important option 
for reducing emissions in South Africa (Altieri et al, 2015). In this sense, the coal BLIPPPP will 
contribute to carbon lock-in in the country’s electricity sector. The use of FBC technology may 
have potential air quality benefits but plant efficiencies are typically similar to traditional coal-
fired power plants; the precise emission implications would depend on final technology choice 
and rank of coal utilised (EPA, 2010).  
Furthermore, the addition of new Waterberg (Lephalale) plants has implications for the 
promotion of mining in that area. Since the Waterberg currently only has one active mine and 
the geology of the area is such that the viability of export only mines is unknown (i.e. mines are 
thought to need both an export and a domestic offtake to make them viable) (SACRM, 2011), 
new power plants enable the development of upstream coal infrastructure that may not have 
been developed otherwise given constrained rail capacity. Expanding power supply in the 
Waterberg also has implications for water and other infrastructure planning, air quality and 
health, but is viewed by the coal industry as necessary given that most of South Africa’s 
remaining coal resources are in the Waterberg region.  
9.2 Gas 
Natural gas-fired power has been proposed as a lower-carbon ‘bridge’ for South Africa’s coal-
based electricity grid and as back-up in a grid with high penetration levels of non-dispatchable 
power. As it stands, the gas industry as a whole in South Africa is relatively small, accounting 
for 2–3% of total primary energy supply, made up almost entirely of Sasol imports by pipeline 
from the Pande and Temane fields in Mozambique. Sasol sells more than half of this gas to 
industrial customers and uses the remainder as feedstock in its coal-to-liquids processes. The 
Pande and Temane fields are relatively small, some 5.5Tcf especially compared to new offshore 
discoveries in Mozambique in the Rovuma basin in 2010 which has 85-100Tcf estimated 
recoverable reserves and could have far more (Ledesma, 2013: 9). This resource within the 
immediate South African region represents significant potential although current plans are to 
initially develop Rovuma for LNG export. 
From an upstream perspective, limited offshore exploration in South Africa has taken place. 
Other potential sources include shale deposits in the Karoo (as yet unexplored in South Africa), 
the development of underground coal gasification (one small demo plant at Majuba currently 
exists) or coal bed methane projects, and imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) or compressed 
natural gas (CNG), potentially from offshore fields in Mozambique. In early 2014, government 
began the development of a Gas Utilisation Master Plan (GUMP). This has yet to be finalised 
and released, though the intention is to outline the infrastructure and other requirements of 
growing the contribution of gas to the South African economy. There are many potential direct 
uses of gas in sectors such as transport or industry, but the role of gas-to-power in anchoring 
demand and thus driving infrastructure development is key to expansion of the sector, the 
potential for which is significant (McKinsey, 2015). 
In 2012 the Minister of Energy made a determination in respect of gas-fired power, allocating 
2500 MW to be procured. The determination has since been amended and the capacity 
allocation expanded to 3126 MW. This is in line with the capacity allocated to CCGTs and 
OCGTs in the IRP 2010 policy adjusted scenario of 237 MW/year CCGT in 2019, 2020 and 
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2021 and 805 MW per year of diesel OCGT in 2022, 2023, and 2025) (DoE, 2011). It should be 
noted that the IRP update increased the allocation of capacity to CCGTs in the base case to 3550 
MW to 2030 (DoE, 2013), but the plan remains unofficial.  
The amendment to the determination also altered the original source (assumed to be LNG or 
pipeline gas) to include other potential sources of gas, probably with a view to encouraging 
upstream development of the industry. Thus the new generation capacity determined in August 
2015  
may be generated from any gas type or source (including natural gas delivered to the 
power generation facility by any method including by pipeline from a natural gas field or 
elsewhere or an LNG based method; coal bed methane; synthesis gas or syngas; above or 
underground coal gasification; Shale Gas and any other gas type or source as may be 
considered appropriate by the procurer), and may be generated using any appropriate 
technology, notwithstanding that the IRP 2010 – 2030 may not have contemplated such 
technology or have considered it viable. (DoE, 2015a).  
Several of these are domestic upstream options. They are presumably loosely based on the 
initial findings of the GUMP, since one of its key objectives is to ‘enable the development of 
indigenous gas resources and to create the opportunity to stimulate the introduction of a 
portfolio of gas supply options’ (DoE, 2015e). However, while the legislative and regulatory 
regime allow the minister discretion over the capacity that is procured, it is problematic to 
simply override the IRP. The Minister of Energy is responsible for energy planning and should 
have ensured that the now outdated technology choices and prices in the IRP were updated, 
rather than simply regulating over the IRP supply options.  
In May 2015, the IPP office released the Request for Information for gas-fired power. The RFI 
has requested information from potential projects, including ‘early power generation facilities’ 
such as power ships or barges that may use heavy fuel oil, light fuel oil or diesel. The RFP is 
anticipated to be released Q4 2015 with bid submission in Q3 2016 according to the DoE (see 
figure above). 
From a decarbonisation perspective, gas is often viewed as a potential ‘bridge’ to a lower-
carbon future, since it has lower GHG emissions at the point of combustion than coal. However, 
several studies have highlighted that assumptions about fugitive emissions of methane (during 
production and transport in particular) differ widely (1–8% of produced volumes), and this can 
affect the overall mitigation benefit of switching from coal to gas (IEA, 2012). Others have 
found that high-gas scenarios can result in limited climate change mitigation effects in the long 
run (see McJeon et al, 2015 for review and analysis). While production-related emissions may 
be less serious for South Africa if it is only importing gas, the inclusion of several upstream 
options would likely have ramifications for national GHG emissions by adding production and 
increasing processing and transport emissions, for example in the production of unconventional 
gas such as shale. Furthermore, altering the fuel from natural gas and replacing it with coal-
based gases as in the ministerial determination above (using for example, syngas/underground 
coal gasification/coalbed methane) subverts the IRP’s switch to a lower-carbon fuel such as 
natural gas. The emission implications for the rest of the economy are potentially significant, 
but further analysis would be required to understand the emissions and decarbonisation 
implications of different sources and technology options.  
The potential for a gas sector was limited historically by the absence of domestic gas resources 
and Eskom’s reluctance to act as an anchor customer for imports. Development therefore 
required either a large local discovery or imports of significant additional pipeline gas for the 
sector to establish itself within the coal, Eskom and Sasol dominated energy economy. Recent 
moves to develop a gas to power customer is a strong indication that this process is underway, 
although there have been similar initiatives that have floundered in the past. The latest initiative 
appears to have support of more necessary key players and has been given impetus by the 
current energy security crisis.  
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9.3 Cogeneration 
In June 2015 the IPP Office released a Request for Bids for 800 MW of cogeneration (though 
the IPP Office are in the process of expanding this to 1800 MW). The technology options are 
split into 200 MW of combined heat and power, 250 MW of waste-to-energy, and 350 MW of 
industrial biomass. Round 1 bids were due in August 2015 but the announcement of preferred 
bidders for round 1 and 2 have been delayed, with no information on when the preferred bidders 
will be announced. Unlike the supply options for coal and renewables, the cogeneration 
programme does not have set local ownership, economic development or community trust 
requirements/criteria. This is partly because the initial rounds were intended to encourage 
brownfield expansion at existing industrial facilities in response to the power crisis.  
10. Transmission constraints  
Key challenges in the rollout of utility-scale renewable energy is the cost and time-line for the 
creation of grid capacity to connect new projects. The location of generation plant in relation to 
the grid directly impacts on grid connection scope, cost and timeline. The proximity of new 
generation plant to the existing grid is not necessarily an indicator of availability of grid 
capacity, as the existing grid may have little or no capacity to accommodate additional 
generation. Grid constraints are becoming more prevalent as the REIPPPP progresses, and the 
limited spare capacity, especially in areas with good resources, is depleted. Grid connection will 
continue to be an increasing challenge in future bid windows. As we discuss proactive plans are 
required to procure grid capacity in alignment with the spatial generation plans of the country. 
This relates to the very real technical challenges to the realisation of decarbonisation as much as 
economic and political challenges. These technical challenges were recognised when the REFIT 
became the REIPPPP (Baker, 2012), but there continue to be inconsistencies between the DoE’s 
procurement process and the technical capacity to absorb further renewable power, exacerbated 
by Eskom’s financial constraints and limitations on capex.  
The South African grid has evolved historically with a high generation and high load centre 
concentrated in the north-east of the country, around the mines and power plants. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 7 which also highlights the cluster of thermal plants (red) to the East of 
Johannesburg. Eskom is the sole transmitter of electricity via a transmission network that 
supplies electricity at high voltages to a number of key customers and to the distribution 
network. Eskom Transmission holds the transmission licence and is responsible for planning, 
construction of transmission infrastructure, maintenance and operations, system operations, 
imports, and houses the grid code secretariat (Eskom, 2012). Planning is undertaken by the Grid 
Planning Department in the Transmission division (Eskom, 2015e).  
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Red dots indicate thermal plants; dotted lines indicate planned grid strengthening 
Figure 7: Generation plant and transmission grid  
(Eskom 2015a)	  
High-voltage transmission corridors evacuate power from the generation centre to other 
important load areas. As it stands, the north east of the country provides the most power and is a 
net exporter, while the rest of the country is a net importer of power. Yet most load is also in the 
north-east, where energy-intensive smelters, refiners and other heavy industry is located (Figure 
8).  
	   	  
Figure 8: Load density in 2020 and 2040  
(Marais, 2015)	  
The introduction of dispersed renewable energy, of which 6400 MW has been approved and 
2400MW connected thus far, much of which is concentrated in the north-west and south of the 
country (Figure 7) has posed a serious challenge for Eskom and required the utility to invest in 
grid expansion and strengthening in response to the introduction of IPPs. As it stands, Eskom 
has invested R2.4 bn in grid development to connect projects from rounds one to three (Marais, 
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2015), yet the first three bid windows have taken up much of the existing and newly created 
capacity in the Northern Cape, Eastern Cape and Western Cape, and there is therefore ‘an 
urgent need to create additional capacity for the REIPPPP’ (Carter-Brown et al, 2015). 
Going forward, however, Eskom grid planning continues to assume that most load will still be 
concentrated in the north-east, even by 2040, which means that as generation becomes more 
dispersed transmission infrastructure will be required to import power to areas that are currently 
net exporters of electricity. Figure 9 shows the shift from Eskom’s current generation footprint 
to a generation footprint incorporating significant new generation capacity dispersed over the 
country. Given the assumptions on decommissioning and load growth, this means that by 2030 
up to 8GW could need to be evacuated into the now dominant north-east (Marais, 2015). 
	  
Figure 9: Comparison of current generation footprint vs potential future generation footprint  
(Marais, 2015) 	  
Transmission challenges facing Eskom are three-fold: financial, operational, and institutional. 
Firstly, Eskom is facing challenges to finding the capital necessary for grid strengthening and 
expansion required for the integration of IPPs as well as expansion from Medupi, Kusile, and 
Ingula. Capital expenditure required from 2015–2024 is estimated at R162bn, of which R145bn 
is for expansion, R7.6 bn for refurbishment, and R5bn is for land and servitudes (Eskom, 2015c: 
80). The third multi-year price determination (MYPD 3) also covers only the short term (to 
2017/18) and not beyond; given the lead times and inefficiencies of building incrementally, this 
raises significant financial risks for both Eskom and IPPs, especially if significant capacity is 
required in the long-term. As pointed out by one interviewee, ‘by the mid-2020s if there is no 
blueprint you wonder how many more renewable energy projects one can build’. 
After a lower than requested allowed revenue under MYPD 3 (R51bn allowed versus R75bn 
requested), Eskom ‘reprioritised’ its capex further, reducing transmission expenditure by R16bn 
to R35bn over the period to 2018. An effect of financial constraints and the quicker than 
anticipated rollout of IPP capacity has been that Eskom has revised its Generation Connection 
Capacity Assessment (GCCA) 2016 to reflect that the IPP connections would happen more 
slowly than initially anticipated. The GCCA is produced to assist IPPs identify areas with spare 
grid capacity, though it is not the official Transmission Development Plan. Unless the MYPD 4 
decision allocates Eskom with further budget for transmission expansion (assuming Nersa 
approves a further increase of revenue), there will continue to be constraints for new IPPs to 
connect especially as Eskom is redirecting capex to its own generation capacity expansion 
programme. Eskom’s role as both generator and grid and transmission operator has key short- 
and long-term effects on access to the grid, raising questions about control and planning of a 
grid in a hybrid power market. As one interviewee said, ‘we can function without an ISMO but 
it is frustrating to live without it’. 
Besides financial barriers, operational barriers and risks include the timing of Environmental 
Impact Assessment applications (three years), and obtaining servitudes, and land (6–8 years), 
and construction of lines (three years) (Creamer 14 October, 2014) which have also contributed 
to the rephasing of transmission capex. Eskom’s response has been to develop a 2040 Network 
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Plan to understand the shifts in power flows and areas that will need grid strengthening in the 
long term. A Strategic Environmental Assessment is now underway to create five transmission 
corridors: including the western and eastern coastal corridors, a solar corridor, a central corridor 
and a northern import corridor, through which capacity from Mozambique could enter. The 
rationale is to limit the resources associated with grid planning and obtain general 
environmental authorisation from the Department of Environmental Affairs. From a generation 
planning perspective, the corridors will play a ‘major role’ in the successful integration of  
whichever future generation scenario unfolds and wherever the new generation will be 
finally located....The investment in and the development of these Power Corridors will 
provide flexibility of implementation and faster connection schedules for all three IRP 
2010 update scenarios or a completely different IRP scenario in the future. (DoE, 2013)  
In the short term, system wide inefficiencies could be dealt with by incorporating the levelised 
cost of Transmission and Distribution into the IPP bid process, to deal with risks of timing and 
capital, as has been suggested by GIZ (2015). The study found that the costs of locating PV 
closer to load (i.e. in areas with lower solar resource) are negligible once the network costs are 
included. Thus, the economic risks of locating solar in areas with greater grid capacity are low, 
and avoiding other risks associated with grid expansion means it would be sensible to develop 
solar resources in line with the current grid capacity of 2.8 GW in the northeast, but then to 
locate new generation capacity beyond the remaining 2.8 GW elsewhere, weighing up the costs 
of grid and other spatial aspects. This highlights a current issue with the REIPPPP procurement 
process which focuses on levelised cost of generation, and excludes other costs related to spatial 
location and system planning.  	  
	  
Figure 10: Proposed transmission corridors  
(Eskom GCCA 2022, 2015: iii) 	  
Finally, these challenges highlight deeper institutional questions, which will have to be resolved 
if decarbonisation is to be achieved. These include the unresolved role of Eskom in a vertically-
integrated market , Eskom’s access to sufficient capital given limited tariff increases from 
Nersa, its internal allocation of capital, and more specifically, how to plan appropriately in the 
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context of rolling bid windows, and how non-Eskom procurement can be co-ordinated to 
minimise system-wide inefficiencies.  
11. Wheeling 
A ‘wheeling agreement’ allows a third party generator access to the transmission grid in order to 
transport electric power to a private off-taker. For this the transmission operator is paid a 
wheeling tariff. While national legislation allows wheeling under Section 22 of the 2006 
National Electricity Act there have been few wheeling deals agreed to date. However since the 
start of the electricity crisis Eskom has developed an interest in facilitating and approving 
wheeling. According to Nersa [in interview, May 2015] Eskom is currently reviewing its policy 
on third party access and has removed a number of barriers to entry. Nersa is also running a 
consultation process on its policy on ‘Regulatory rules on network charges for third-party 
transportation of Energy’ and in early 2015 launched an advisory forum on wheeling. This has 
involved consultations with the Energy Intensive User Group, Eskom, South African Renewable 
Energy Council, South African Independent Power Producer Association and Association of 
Municipal Electricity Users to deal with pricing issues. While Eskom’s willingness to work on 
this issue has improved, there have been problems in cases where electricity needs to be 
transported via a municipal network. In particular there are instances of municipalities posing 
blockages to facilitating wheeling, given that there is a disincentive caused by the significant 
revenue they gain from on-selling electricity.  
12. South Africa’s potential nuclear programme 
As discussed above, IRP 2010 allows for a 9600 MW nuclear programme. The revised IRP, 
released in late 2013, which is now unlikely to be approved (see Section 6) has raised questions 
about the costs and viability of nuclear. According to announcements by the DoE, a bidding 
process for a 9600 MW nuclear programme which would consist of up to eight nuclear power 
plants was slated to start in June 2015. This would see procurement starting in September 2015, 
preferred bidders being chosen in December, and nuclear power stations being built between 
2017 and 2030. However, at the time of writing such a process does not seem to have been 
initiated. 
Details regarding how the nuclear programme will be financed, how much it will cost, who will 
pay for it, who might build it and who might own and operate it have been entirely lacking in 
transparency (Paton 02 June, 2015), although Russia’s state-owned atomic energy company, 
Rosatom, appears to be the preferred partner in any deal. Current capital cost estimates by 
external experts, as yet unconfirmed, are at R1 trillion. While National Treasury has been 
excluded from the process of the costing of any potential nuclear programme, it has raised 
questions about the programme’s affordability (Mantshantsha & Marrian 31 August, 2015) and 
in July 2014 insisted on a ‘thorough assessment’ of the programme’s financing. According to 
Business Day, the first time that Treasury were included in the discussions was in August 2015 
who according to journalist Xolisa Phillip, were ‘roped in at the end to work out whether or not 
SA can afford it’ (Phillip 28 August, 2015). 
The procurement of nuclear has become ever more secretive, in keeping with recent moves 
described in Section 5. According to President Jacob Zuma's ‘Written reply to questions in the 
national assembly of 27 March 2015’ (The Presidency, 2015), The National Nuclear Energy 
Executive Coordination Committee (NNEECC) was established by cabinet in November 2011 
and ‘is tasked with providing oversight and decision making on the nuclear policy and new 
build programme’. In June 2014 The NNEECC was converted into the Energy Security Cabinet 
Subcommittee (ESCS) ‘responsible for oversight, coordination and direction for the activities 
for the entire energy sector’, chaired by President Jacob Zuma. While the committee reports to 
cabinet, ‘its proceedings and documents are classified under the Minimum Information Security 
Standard Act (MISS Act) as TOP SECRET’ [sic] and therefore its agenda and minutes are not 
publicly available. 
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Government has held a series of ‘vendor parades’ with interested companies and countries, 
including Russia, China, France, and South Korea. In addition, representatives from Russia’s 
Rosatom have met a number of times with government delegations. Zuma is understood to have 
visited Russia in 2014 (Ashton, 2015) and engaged in further meetings in July 2015 during the 
BRICS summit. In the energy budget speech in May 2015, the Minister for Energy stated:  
South Africa has signed various Inter-Governmental Agreements or IGAs, laying the 
foundation for cooperation, trade and exchange for nuclear technology as well as 
procurement. These agreements describe broad areas of nuclear cooperation and they 
differ on emphasis, based on the unique needs of each country. Completed IGA’s will be 
submitted to Cabinet for discussion and endorsement in the coming weeks. The requisite 
parliamentary processes for ratification of these agreements will follow. (DoE, 2015d).  
Government also announced that a nuclear skills development and training programme is under 
way in cooperation with China, Russia and South Korea. 
Many have argued that the nuclear process is being largely driven by the presidency and a 
minority within the DoE, something which Gumede has described as an issue of patronage 
(Kings 18 August, 2014). One policy analyst argued that most ministers would not even 
understand how the nuclear deals would work. Others argued that Zuma lacks the political 
constituency to push through the nuclear programme to the end, particularly in light of the lack 
of support from National Treasury. 
Concerns over the viability of the programme are widespread. For instance, Nersa implied that 
there are serious opportunity costs associated with nuclear and that there is little justification for 
the affordability argument. An Eskom representative indicated that to construct the entire fleet 
would not make economic sense even though there might be a role for some nuclear to displace 
coal. Moreover, the country would need an innovative financing model in order to be able to 
develop nuclear, particularly given that Eskom’s current credit rating would seriously inflate the 
utility’s cost of borrowing. According to Nersa, it is more likely that nuclear would be 
implemented by a special purpose vehicle in which Eskom would be involved, rather than as a 
pure Eskom project. In September 2015, the Minister of Energy stated that a study on 
affordability and the funding model will be shared with the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
on Energy, but in the interests of commercial sensitivity would be tabled as ‘classified’ until 
procurement has been completed (Paton 01 September, 2015). 
As we have discussed in Section 6, government’s authority to procure nuclear is set by the 
integrated resource plan (IRP 2010). While the cabinet-approved IRP 2010 provides for 9 600 
MW of nuclear power, the IRP update in 2013 suggests that the decision on nuclear could be 
postponed until at least 2025. It further refers to ‘persistent and unresolved uncertainty 
surrounds nuclear capital costs’ and calculates an estimated overnight cost of $5800/kW in 2012 
US dollars (DoE, 2013: 12). In comparison the DoE has estimated that it would cost $4200 per 
KW (Creamer 14 August, 2015). This lower estimate appears to be based on the lower end of 
Rosatom’s estimated cost of $40-50 billion for eight units of the VVER-1200 (Russia’s version 
of a pressurised water reactor), excluding owner’s costs and own consumption of each plant. As 
one member of the industry stated: ‘Nuclear was forced into the IRP. The model didn’t choose 
nuclear. It results in an almost 40% reserve margin’. It is hard to envisage that we will be in a 
state of oversupply and we will have to pay for oversupply. The desirability and/or timing of 
unclear is further questioned in the National Development Plan (NPC, 2012). 
In general the undue haste and lack of evident rationale of the nuclear programme strongly 
suggests that the electricity planning framework set up in the Electricity Regulation Act (2006) 
and recently given effect to in the IRP 2010 is giving way to centralised, behind-closed-doors 
planning that is open to the potentially very powerful influence that nuclear investments would 
involve. In the meantime the DoE is justifying the programme on the grounds that it will help to 
meet the country’s climate change commitments as well as providing a solution to the electricity 
crisis (Gqirana 01 September, 2015). While nuclear generation may be considered a ‘low-
carbon’ technology, at a more fundamental level decarbonisation should also prioritise the 
collective public good. If low-carbon electricity generation is achieved while at the same time 
undermining or corrupting the intended operation of electricity planning legislation, questions 
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arise as to the ultimate net impact on the public good. The gradual rolling back of the 
painstakingly constructed systems that have to some extent brought energy and economic 
planning into transparent public procedures threatens to undermine the ability of democratic 
government to counter these influences. Finally, given the potential yet currently unknown cost 
of any potential nuclear programme, as Butler (2015) points out, the ‘real price of nuclear power 
will also depend on who absorbs the risks’ (Butler 05 June, 2015).  
13. Climate change mitigation policy 
South Africa has both domestic climate policy and an international pledge it has made under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Going forward, 
international pressure on South Africa to at least maintain its Copenhagen pledge is likely to 
increase as countries submit their ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ (INDCs) in the 
lead up to COP21 in 2015. These may become commitments (obligations with a legal nature) or 
remain voluntary or conditional – that remains to be negotiated. Whatever the outcome, the 
mitigation commitments by South Africa and other developing countries will be more like those 
of developed countries. Increased reporting and review has already been agreed, and greater 
transparency will be expected in future. This will increase the expectations on South Africa, 
which has submitted an INDC that reiterates its Copenhagen pledge and formalises the 
emissions trajectory range outlined in domestic policy in the international sphere. This 
reiteration of Copenhagen was subject to significant opposition from domestic emitters and 
parts of the state, for whom coal is viewed as a driving force for industrialisation (NCCC 26 
March, 2015).  
Domestic policy is codified in the South African National Climate Change Response White 
Paper (NCCRWP) (RSA, 2011) which was led by the DEA and approved by Cabinet in 2011. 
The NCCRWP is a key document for decarbonisation and provides a foundation for both 
mitigation and adaptation that is well integrated with the UNFCCC negotiations and 
agreements, while being firmly based in the South African context. However, this policy has 
had minimal impact on, and is poorly integrated with, other key policy areas related to 
decarbonisation that we describe above, such as minerals, energy, industrial planning, trade and 
industry, and economic development (Tyler & Trollip, 2011). Initial attempts at implementing 
key elements of the policy have proved to be undermined by this disconnect and the relative 
weakness of the department behind the policy, the DEA. Despite the political will within the 
DEA and the driving forces of the UNFCCC process, this policy fragmentation has 
characterised the development of the policy. Hence the DEA failed, and continues to fail, to 
integrate with other policies, departments and actors. However progressive and aspirational the 
NCCRWP may be, addressing this fragmentation will be fundamental in its success and the role 
it plays in decarbonising the South African economy.  
The NCCRWP was the outcome of a six-year process. In the early 2000s it became clear that 
the UNFCCC process would eventually lead to an agreement in which developed and the 
developing countries would be required to contribute to mitigation efforts through the reduction 
of GHG emissions. In anticipation of this, and within the context of South Africa’s moral and 
legal obligation to make a fair contribution to the global mitigation effort, the then Department 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism released the Climate Change Response Strategy (DEA, 
2004). In 2005, a National Climate Change Conference was held, and in 2006 Cabinet mandated 
a process where the potential for mitigation of GHG emissions in South Africa would be 
examined in order to provide a sound scientific basis for a long term climate policy. The 
outcome of this process was the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS). The LTMS 
modelling was completed in 2007, and in 2008 Cabinet released the ‘Vision, Strategic Direction 
and Framework for Climate Change Response Policy’, which considered the results of the 
LTMS (Van Schalkwyk, 2008). The Copenhagen COP15 in 2009 was important for renewed 
commitment to climate change mitigation internationally and nationally, and saw President 
Zuma committing to reduce emissions from a business-as-usual trajectory by 34% and 42% by 
2020 and 2025 respectively. This commitment and the figures were loosely underpinned by the 
LTMS analysis but were decided politically. This international undertaking, reinforced by top-
level political commitment, as well as the South African hosting of COP17 in Durban in 2011, 
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fast-tracked the creation of South Africa’s climate policy – perhaps contributing its disconnect 
from other policies and departments.  
The NCCRWP has two key objectives. The first is to effectively manage and prepare for the 
impacts of climate change while building and sustaining South Africa’s socio-economic 
development. The second is to make a fair contribution to GHG emission reduction in order to 
avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change while maintaining commitments to national 
economic development. Meeting these objectives, as well as the commitment to the PPD 
trajectory, are conditional on international financial, technology and capacity building support. 
The key elements of mitigation policy outlined in the NCCRWP are: setting the performance 
benchmark, identifying desired sectoral mitigation contributions (or desired emission reduction 
outcomes – DEROs), defining carbon budgets for significant GHG emitting sectors, the 
development and submission of mitigation plans associated with DEROs by different sectors, 
the use of different types of mitigation approaches, policies, measures and action to optimise 
mitigation outcomes, using the market to support DEROs, and establishing a national emissions 
data-base in the form of a GHG inventory to monitor and evaluate progress.  
The NCCRWP is currently facing challenges associated with implementation. The main issues 
are around the benchmark National GHG Emissions Trajectory Range, the Carbon Budget, and 
the DEROs process. This is further stressed by a number of actors challenging the LTMS 
process and its relationship with the NCCRWP, especially the benchmark range (see Tyler & 
Torres-Gunfaus, 2015).  
The benchmark National GHG Emissions Trajectory Range, detailed in the NCCRWP, provides 
a base from which to measure the efficacy of mitigation action. According to this benchmark 
range, South African policy projects emissions will peak between 2020 and 2025 in a range 
with a lower limit of 398 Mt CO2-eq and upper limits of 583 Mt CO2-eq and 614 Mt CO2-eq 
respectively. South Africa’s emissions will then plateau for up to 10 years after the peak, and 
from 2036 emissions will decline in absolute terms to a range with a lower limit of 212 Mt CO2-
eq and an upper limit of 428 Mt CO2-eq by 2050. With GHG emissions already reaching 518 Mt 
CO2-eq (including FOLU)19 according to the 2010 GHG Inventory, South Africa is already well 
above the lower limit of the peak range. The challenges to the benchmark range, as well as the 
others mentioned, stem from the impact that implementing this policy will have on key sectors 
in the economy (most importantly energy, industry and trade), and the disconnect between it 
and other policy areas.  
DEA has been in the process of establishing a system for implementing mitigation policy. 
According to the NCCRWP the benchmark range is to be cascaded down to emissions budgets 
for sectors and entities within three years, with the large emitting entities required to ‘submit 
mitigation plans that set out how they intend to achieve the desired emission reduction 
outcomes’ (DEA, 2011: 27). The NCCRWP states that within two years an ‘optimal mix of 
measures will be developed’ (DEA, 2011: 27). However, four years after publication of the 
NCCRWP the budgets for sectors and entities have not yet been allocated, and the mitigation 
plans and optimal mix of measures have not been forthcoming.  
Desired Emission Reduction Outcomes and company-level carbon budgets are part of the 
planned implementation system which remains incomplete. Overall, the system is likely to be a 
hybrid, meaning a mix of top-down and bottom-up elements. Work on DEROs is currently 
dealing with the division of an overall national trajectory among sectors, recognising that the 
contributions of sectors can change, and may be very different in the long-term (2050) 
compared to now. Further, as sectors are not legal entities, the work on DEROs aims to provide 
important guidance and policy signals in lieu of direct regulation with the use of regulatory 
instruments.  
Company-level carbon budgets are being developed into regulatory instruments. This requires 
data reported by companies and probably a firmer legal basis. The process of discussing carbon 
                                                      
19  FOLU refers to forestry and other land use. In South Africa, FOLU is a net sink; excluding FOLU, emissions in 
2010 rise to 544 Mt CO2-eq. 
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budgets has been initiated by DEA, although at the time of writing no carbon budgets had been 
allocated to any company. DEA and National Treasury have negotiated the inclusion of an 
allowance for companies paying the carbon tax if they are subject to company-level carbon 
budgets. However, despite a process to negotiate the allocation of emissions space between 
users (the DEROs), DEA has instead elected to implement a process whereby firms are asked to 
report but are not legally bound to report or reduce emissions in line with sectoral or company 
level budgets. This was a key criticism in interviews. As one civil society member stated:  
‘they won’t be incorporated into law and are not legally binding. Governments are 
supposed to make, implement and regulate laws. If you have a government process that is 
not implementable, enforceable and has no regulation… then it is just a bunch of people 
talking. One would assume for something like this you would need a raft of legislation.’ 
The carbon tax, discussed below, will therefore potentially be the only legally enforceable 
mitigation action currently being implemented, and still faces significant opposition from 
emitters and other government departments. Business in the past argued for implementation of 
the carbon tax to be delayed to align it the carbon budget and DEROs processes within the DEA 
(Sasol, 2013; BUSA, 2013), although the tax has been delayed anyway as the policy and 
legislative processes have not been completed. Business in early 2015 walked out of the DEA’s 
public consultation for mitigation policy processes on carbon budgets and desired emissions 
reductions outcomes. The carbon tax, when implemented, will thus be the primary enforceable 
mitigation action in the country, since DEROs will not be legally enforceable in the short-term. 
The other primary instrument is the IRP and the ministerial determinations, which allocate new 
build under the Regulations on New Generation Capacity (as discussed in Section 6).  
14. Carbon tax 
The National Treasury initially introduced the idea of a carbon price as part of a broader process 
of environmental fiscal reform in the early 2000s. After a discussion document was released in 
2010 (NT, 2010) outlining the reasoning for implementation, a carbon tax policy paper was 
released in 2013 that included the design elements of the tax (NT, 2013). Implementation of the 
tax was targeted for 2016, but Treasury had yet to release a Bill for approval by Parliament by 
mid-2015, even though this needs to be approved by Cabinet before it is presented to the 
legislature, and a January 2016 commencement is increasingly unlikely given that Parliament 
closes mid-November. The Carbon Tax Bill (2015) was released for comment in November 
2015, with a new targeted commencement date of January 2017.  
The policy work has been underpinned by several economic analyses including by Treasury 
itself, academics, and the World Bank (Legote, 2012; Caetano & Thurlow, 2014 for a review of 
modelling work on the tax). Industry has undertaken its own analysis, (usually at a sector- or 
firm-specific level) though the modelling is seldom made public. At this stage, executive and 
legislative approval is a ‘political process’ according to one government member. While the 
Minister of Finance is supportive (as is the DEA, who are driving mitigation policy but are 
known to be a less powerful ministry), Treasury faces opposition in Cabinet from the DTI and 
Department of Economic Development (EDD), which are ‘strongly opposed’ to the tax. It is 
unclear whether the DoE is politically supportive, but the IPP Office has incorporated the 
carbon tax into the baseload coal programme bid documents, and IPPs will be expected to pay 
the tax.  
Treasury also faces significant opposition from carbon-intensive business such as Sasol and 
Eskom, mining and minerals companies, and business groupings such as Business Unity South 
Africa, the Chamber of Mines, and the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of Southern 
Africa (SEIFSA). Other parts of business have not been strong supporters of the tax, including 
those that stand to benefit from a shift in relative prices of technologies. The renewable energy 
industry, for example, has not seen the need to support the carbon tax in public. As one industry 
interviewee said, ‘the market has been won for them, so why fight when they don’t need to?’. 
Treasury’s analysis of the comments received on the tax found that most respondents were 
supportive of mitigation policy in general, but with caveats around the use and design of the tax. 
This is contradicted by the ongoing public opposition and lobbying, especially by business; it 
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may also indicate growing opposition as implementation of the tax approaches. At this point, 
some business groupings are stating that they no longer support either the tax or mitigation 
policy more generally.20 
Within government, DTI and EDD remain strongly opposed to implementation of the tax. It is 
understood that within DTI there exists a constituency who see any threat to industry as 
something to be prevented due to the risks of de-industrialisation (interview with government) 
and the concomitant (assumed) impact on jobs and growth. This is despite a ‘green industries’ 
component in the Industrial Policy Action Plan and the inclusion of the green economy in the 
EDD’s New Growth Path. As one interviewee pointed out, this may reflect a bias within those 
departments towards the interests of large energy-intensive industry as opposed to small and 
medium business. 
In short, DTI have ‘adopted the business line’. They view South Africa as a small player in the 
international negotiations with relatively small emissions who will be unfairly prejudiced by 
action. As business has argued, South Africa is a ‘minor player’ (Chamber of Mines), the 
country’s emissions are ‘tiny’ (AngloGold Ashanti), and South Africa accounts for less than 1% 
of global emissions and requires space to grow (Chemical and Allied Industries Association) 
(all presentations to the Davis Tax Committee). 
In terms of costs, BUSA has stated that the “economic impacts are likely to be substantial’ 
(BUSA, 2013). This is in line with DTI’s public concerns around electricity price increases, 
which is ‘informed by the often repeated perspective that sharply escalating electricity prices… 
constitute serious dangers to the viability of the manufacturing sector’ (DTI, 2013).21 As one 
government interviewee summarised, the tax comes at ‘too high a cost. It is not the right time 
for a carbon tax. If you are going to increase the electricity price you might as well raise taxes 
and give that money directly to Eskom. If you want to raise taxes then you should do so.’ 
Furthermore, as the Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davies has said: 
On the climate change front, our view is that great caution must be exercised to ensure 
that emergent carbon mitigation policy interventions and environmental regulation – 
including the proposed carbon tax – are carefully sequenced and calibrated, taking into 
account the concrete circumstances of the most vulnerable sectors, so that important 
domestic capabilities are not destroyed and jobs lost in the process. (DTI, 2014: 7)22 
This is partly due to real concerns about affordability for firms currently impacted by low global 
commodity prices and rising costs; yet macroeconomic analysis has also shown that the impacts 
of the tax on the economy will be relatively small, provided the revenue is recycled (Alton et al, 
2012). But business has also used arguments that go to the core of the DTI’s (and the ANC’s) 
ideas about industrial development and mineral resources. Although the DTI has several streams 
within its industrial policy, energy-intensive sectors remain important within the Industrial 
Policy Action Plan and the IPAP includes a Minerals Beneficiation Strategy taken over from the 
Department of Mineral Resources (DMR, 2011) some years ago. This strategy is currently being 
                                                      
20  For example, the Chemical and Allied Industries Association (CAIA) stated at the Davis Tax Committee that 
‘CAIA does not support South Africa’s continued development of climate change policy, including that of the 
carbon tax’ (CAIA, 2015).  
21  Similarly: ‘In addition, government has committed to ensuring that administered prices do not, as a group, rise 
faster than inflation. EDD undertakes to monitor administered prices and on that basis work with the relevant 
authorities to help develop more sustainable balances around cost to users, financing options, and quality of 
service’ (DTI, 2014: 55).  
22  The dti, as is well-known, supports measures to promote structural change in the South African economy 
towards more value-adding, labour-intensive and less energy-intensive sectors of production. The fact remains, 
however, that at present the distribution of capital stock across the economy continues to reside largely within 
the MEC sector. To ensure continued economic growth, job creation and poverty reduction will require 
measures to manage the transition of our traditional resource-processing sectors so that they do not collapse 
under increasing electricity prices and/or a mistimed or miscalibrated carbon tax – whilst at the same time 
implementing measures to improve the competitiveness and support the growth of downstream value-adding, 
labour- intensive sectors and the new green industry sector. These can and must include investment in green 
energy, industrial energy efficiency and demand-side management linked to localization. (DTI, 2014:114) 
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developed into a Minerals Beneficiation Action Plan (MBAP) by the DTI. It reflects support for 
beneficiation in DMR and equally, in the African National Congress’s policy on minerals. Thus, 
arguments such as the ‘Shift to significantly lower carbon intensity [is] not possible concurrent 
with beneficiation objectives’, made by BUSA (2013), are received receptively.  
Initially, commentators characterised this opposition as ‘misalignment’, assuming that the 
viewpoint of different departments on mitigation could be aligned. However, there are far more 
fundamental oppositions, related to understandings of how industrial development in South 
Africa can take place, how to use the country’s resources, and the risk and opportunities of 
climate mitigation and international censure. While a narrative around ‘green growth’ 
opportunities does exist, it does not clearly outline the complexities and difficulties of transition 
and how to manage the process of winners and losers. As one government interviewee pointed 
out, ‘the cost of transition is critical and this is what we need to focus on’, yet there does not 
appear to be co-ordination within government about understanding short-, medium- and long-
term impacts of mitigation policy. One business interviewee said succinctly: ‘Without 
understanding the short-term dynamics of industry and business, government will make a 
decision’, yet ‘we are not having a conversation about [the] short-term economic transition’. 
Opposition has not only arisen from energy- and carbon-intensive industry, though they have 
been the primary actors. Criticism from labour and civil society have centred primarily on 
design issues and impacts on the poor, i.e. how to protect the poor from price increases or how 
best to recycle the revenue. NUMSA, for example, have agreed that tackling climate change is a 
necessity and supported the introduction of the tax subject to design changes related to revenue 
recycling. Indeed, unions in general ‘are progressive until it affects their workers’, including in 
energy-intensive industry such as aluminium smelters. Their interests are clear, and the unions 
‘are on your side until their members suffer’.  
Despite evidence that the current carbon tax would not be high enough to encourage significant 
shifts in emissions (Alton et al, 2012), the impacts on firms may still be substantial. Business 
has therefore not been supportive of the implementation of the carbon tax, and opposition has 
increased as the process has progressed. The concerns of other parts of society – who are 
supportive of mitigation policy and carbon pricing in principle – have centred on equity and 
welfare impacts on the poor. Despite ongoing debates around design issues, the enactment of 
the Carbon Tax Bill will be a key emissions reduction mechanism, especially as in the short-
term it will be the only legally enforceable mechanism besides the IRP.  
15. Conclusion 
This research has focused on South Africa’s electricity sector as a central feature of its highly 
energy-intensive economy. This paper has been written to accompany the recent study 
undertaken by Altieri et al (2015) who unpacked the technical possibilities of meeting South 
Africa’s development objectives at the same time as commitments to climate change mitigation. 
While such a task obviously goes beyond the electricity sector – and we highlight the significant 
contribution of other sectors such as transport and liquid fuels to the country’s carbon emissions 
as areas for further research – we have selected electricity as our main focus. This is firstly 
because the electricity sector currently emits 45% of the country’s emissions: decarbonisation in 
South Africa’s electricity sector and the economy more broadly cannot be achieved without 
reducing the absolute contribution of coal-fired power at the same time as integrating a range of 
renewable energy (such as wind, PV and CSP) and storage technologies. Secondly, the 
country’s electricity sector and the coal that supplies it are tied up within complex and path-
dependent relationships between the historic core of the country’s growth path predicated on its 
MEC. This is still significant, despite recent national and international shifts that have seen a 
decline in the contribution that mining and associated commodities make to the economy. 
Notably South Africa is, on the one hand, attempting to implement a policy requiring significant 
reduction in future emissions from coal combustion in the form of the National Climate Change 
Response White Paper at the same time as the coal industry appears to be promoting expansion 
both for local consumption and export, supported by planned capital expansion in railways and 
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ports. In the meantime, a successful renewable energy procurement programme is underway 
which has had little interaction with national policy for climate change policy. 
This paper has provided an in-depth and historical analysis of the key features of South Africa’s 
electricity sector and the stakeholders and beneficiaries operating within it. In order to analyse 
the structural, institutional and political constraints to the realisation of decarbonisation, we 
have considered the nature of formal and informal relationships including between different 
government departments, the national utility Eskom, coal mining companies, energy-intensive 
users and finance. We began by exploring the country’s MEC as central to the country’s 
historical core based around mining and minerals-beneficiation. This exploration was followed 
by an analysis of the crucial and dominant role that the monopoly utility Eskom has played in 
the economy, some of the dynamics of the coal industry and its relationship to the electricity 
sector. Section 4 explored Eskom’s financial crisis including some of the long-term and path-
dependent factors that have led up to it, and importantly what this crisis might mean for the 
future of Eskom as a monopoly utility going forward. Section 5 examined the way in which 
electricity is governed in South Africa, in particular key developments in policy and regulation 
that have attempted to remove energy policy and planning from opaque processes previously 
dominated by Eskom and the former DME. However, we found that while a carefully 
constructed legal and regulatory framework has taken significant steps towards transparent 
governance and policy, this has been undermined by more recent measures such as the war 
room, and government’s side-lining of the IRP process, discussed in greater depth in Sections 6 
and 12. 
Despite its various shortcomings and the significant role that coal will continue to play in the 
next 20 years, the IRP still represents a step forward due to its carbon constraint, and as the first 
and relatively transparent process involving public consultation for energy planning. But the 
latest draft of the IRP seems to have undermined this, having apparently been scrapped by 
government on the grounds that the plan questions the need and rationale for a large nuclear 
procurement programme. In the words of one energy analyst, such a move ‘indicates a swing 
back to energy planning by secret back-room decision-making’, and the ‘excessive secrecy’ 
(DME, 1998: 24) that the 1998 Energy White Paper had hoped to overcome. Section 7 describes 
the REIPPPP as perhaps the most successful site of decarbonisation in South Africa to date and 
considers various factors that may threaten its sustainability going forward, including Eskom’s 
ability and/or willingness to connect projects to the grid and tensions between the demands of 
project finance and potentially progressive economic development and community ownership. 
The section on REIPPPP is followed in Sections 8 and 9 by a discussion of how moves to 
introduce other forms of privately generated power are emerging, namely embedded generation 
solar PV, coal, cogeneration and gas. The technical and financial challenges of the transmission 
grid to adapt to new sources of generation, particularly renewable energy was discussed in 
Section 11. Section 12 considers that, while nuclear is arguably ‘low-carbon’ and therefore 
could be considered as contributing to decarbonisation, there are serious questions with regards 
to its effect on the public good. It is being negotiated via a highly secretive and undemocratic 
decision making process with potentially catastrophic effects on the public purse. The final 
section discusses the nature of South Africa’s commitments to climate change mitigation and 
the fundamental disconnect between climate policy and energy policy. 
Our research has demonstrated how decision-making and changes within South Africa’s 
electricity sector are embedded within complex social, political and economic forces and 
relationships. Such a reality makes it evident that there is no discrete solution for the realisation 
of decarbonisation and that any serious steps towards it must embrace these dynamics. We 
would argue that while ministerial discretion over technology choices may in some instances 
work in favour of decarbonisation, as we have seen in the case of REIPPPP. However, such 
discretion may also work in favour of other sources of generation, such as coal and nuclear. We 
would argue, therefore, that the answer to a power crisis is not to allow ministerial discretion 
over technology choices. Rather, South Africa needs a planning process that is flexible enough 
to respond to the challenges of the current supply crisis in the short-term, as well as longer-term 
crises related to economic and environmental sustainability.  
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Beyond the technological considerations of decarbonisation is that of the ‘just’ transition 
(Swilling & Annecke, 2012). If moves to a lower-carbon economy are to be sustainable, they 
must also take into account questions of economic inequality, social welfare and an inclusive 
growth path. Yet levels of access to energy in South Africa are paralleled by its major 
development challenges as one of the most unequal countries in the world, linked to its legacy 
of racial oppression and inequality. As we have also uncovered, a just transition in South 
Africa’s electricity sector is further challenged by what appears to be the reintroduction of 
opaque decision making processes characteristic of the apartheid era in electricity as much as in 
other parts of the economy. Amongst other things, such opacity may facilitate a substantial, as 
yet undetermined, investment in nuclear power that will shape the country’s electricity mix, its 
infrastructure and related tariffs for years to come. 
In analysing the structural, institutional, and political constraints to the realisation of deep 
decarbonisation, we have considered the nature of formal and informal relationships between 
the DoE, Nersa, Eskom, municipalities, the DPE and the DEA. We have uncovered the shifting 
nature of networks between institutions, actors and technologies involved in the electricity 
sector. This includes complex and often opaque relationships between the state, the ANC and 
business, and the emergence of new players in renewable energy investment and technology 
supply who are in turn forging alliances with more conventional players in the country’s MEC. 
While we have primarily focused on national factors in this paper, it must be emphasised that 
the country’s electricity sector is further linked to and influenced by an evolving global system 
that includes increasing pressures on the world’s resources, priorities for climate change 
mitigation, global technological transitions and a globally financialised and interdependent 
economy. 
We have further demonstrated how in recent decades, and particularly since the end of 
apartheid, the governance of South Africa’s electricity sector has gone from a monopoly 
parastatal, closely integrated with the historical economic core of mining and minerals 
beneficiation, supplied by long-term contracts for cheap coal, to one that is now in financial 
crisis and unable to meet national requirements. Eskom is no longer able to rely on the country’s 
abundant coal supplies and is now accompanied, if not challenged, by a credible though still 
emerging programme for independent power production, notably in renewable energy. At the 
same time, an untransparent and highly contested process for the procurement of nuclear power 
is developing in parallel, to be procured and paid for by the state and in turn electricity 
consumers, but is likely to be supplied by, managed and controlled by a foreign company. 
The various cases of decarbonisation taking place within South Africa’s economy and 
electricity sector are due to a diversity of drivers. Some are clearly conscious attempts driven by 
environmental and sometimes social concerns, but more often than not they are driven by 
economic, financial, and often political interests. Within the electricity sector we have 
uncovered serious tensions between priorities for economic growth that often depend on high-
carbon infrastructure development, and priorities for climate change mitigation that depend on 
its reduction. In either case, such moves are unlikely to replace the important role played by coal 
in the energy sector and economy, and a core feature of the country’s unique system of 
accumulation, the minerals-energy complex. Coal interests still hold a dominant sway within 
national decision-making and within the electricity sector, both in upstream supply and 
consumption. The introduction of coal IPPs, though not part of Eskom, are both a cause and a 
symptom of such interests. The role of nuclear, the subject of significant debate and 
controversy, currently remains uncertain. Furthermore, as the country faces its worst electricity 
crisis in 40 years, wealthy domestic and business consumers are implementing measures to ‘buy 
themselves out’ of the risks of insecure supply. Such a practice may marginalise the poor, who 
do not have the capital to invest in rooftop solar PV or alternative forms of energy generation 
and are increasingly unable to afford rising costs of electricity supply. 
Finally, in South Africa there is a recognition that the conventional supply-demand paradigm of 
electricity at the national level and elsewhere is shifting. This, it has been argued forms, part of 
a global transformation in the way in which electricity is generated and consumed and offers 
new opportunities and challenges for both consumers and producers of energy and is resulting 
in new regulatory models (PWC, 2014). The key question is whether new modes of power 
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generation and consumption that are emerging in South Africa have the potential to disrupt 
Eskom’s business model and the institutional structure in which it has evolved, and whether 
Eskom as a key element in the country’s MEC is subject to change. Finally, will shifts in the 
electricity sector herald fundamental changes to the economy, to society and to the environment, 
or will emissions continue to rise as established technologies and interests continue to dominate 
in the electricity sector in particular and the energy sector more broadly?  
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Annex: Eskom’s financing 
Eskom’s capital expenditure programme is being funded by debt raised by Eskom, the utility’s 
internally generated cash flows, contributions from National Treasury; electricity tariff 
increases, a 2009 loan from the African Development Bank of €1.86 billion (about $2.63 
billion) which was co-financed with €1.22 billion from European Export Credit Agencies 
(AfDB 2009), and $3.75 billion from the World Bank and other bilateral donors approved in 
2010 as part of the ‘Eskom Investment Support Project’. Eskom also received a R60 billion 
subordinated loan from the South African government in 2009 and a R176 billion guarantee 
facility, of which the latter was extended by another R174-billion to a total of R350-billion in 
late 2010 (Donnelly, 2011), as well as a R23bn equity injection in 2015.  
Prior to the pursuit of these funds, Eskom’s income was determined almost entirely by the 
regulated tariffs for its electricity sales. In recent years the Regulator has approved significant 
tariff increases, albeit below the amounts applied for by Eskom. Tariffs are regulated by Nersa 
through the multi-year price determination process. Nersa considers Eskom’s application and 
approves itemised expenditure for capital plant, primary fuel, salaries, demand side management 
programmes, electricity purchases (including imports or ‘buy-backs’, i.e. payments to large 
users to cease production) and other operating expenditure. Along with a return on assets, this 
makes up the revenue requirement for a given year. Eskom then needs to account to Nersa for 
expenditure under these items. The effective tariff is meant to cover costs, including a profit for 
the sole shareholder (government, as represented by the DPE) to reward it for its capital 
investment, and also to ensure that capital is valued. The revenue allocated is used to set 
generation, transmission wholesale, retail and distribution tariffs, according to the Electricity 
Pricing Policy (DME, 2008) and interpretation of the policy by Nersa. Such an arrangement 
provides significant discretion to Nersa. In the 1990s, the Eskom price compact with National 
Energy Regulator, Nersa’s predecessor, resulted in the real price of electricity falling for several 
years. Tariffs are now, and continue to be, below full cost-reflectivity but have also increased 
sharply under the MYPD application rounds in response to the revaluing of Eskom’s asset base, 
and increasing operational costs especially a large increase coal prices, and a very large capital 
expansion programme largely to make up a shortfall in supply capacity costs. 
Eskom’s recent applications tariff increases under MYPD 2 and 3 have resulted in revenue 
significantly lower than applied for, leading Eskom to continue to refer to a ‘hole’ in its 
financing to the tune of R250 billion in 2013 (FIN24 22 October, 2014). Under MYPD 2 
(2010/2011-2012/2013), Eskom requested tariff increases of 35% per annum and was awarded 
tariff increases of 24.8%, 25.8% and 25.9% (Nersa, 2010). When Eskom applied for tariff 
increases under MYPD 3 (2013/14-2017/18), it requested year on year increases of around 
16%23, but was awarded only 8% per annum and a total approved revenue of R906 553 million. 
The shortfalls in tariffs have severely impacted Eskom’s finances. 
In January 2015 Eskom’s financial crisis became particularly acute, with questions over whether 
Eskom would be able to make primary fuel purchases. This led to a government bailout which 
came in two parts. The first in the form of an equity injection of R23 billion, to be spent over a 
five year period which was to be raised from the sale of government’s ‘non-strategic assets’ 
under the Eskom Special Appropriation Act24 (Act 7 of 2015). The second part was the 
conversion of a R60 billion subordinated loan, paid between 2008 to 2011 and converted into 
equity under the Eskom Subordinated Loan Special Appropriation Amendment Act25 (Act 6 of 
2015). The R23 billion made provision for cash flow to allow Eskom to continue operations and 
the conversion of the loan to equity improved Eskom’s financial position to allow it to raise 
debt for its capital expansion programme. However, a funding plan remains outstanding to 
                                                      
23  16.07%, 15.95%, 16.19%, 15.89%, 16.04% over the period (Eskom, 2012).  
24  In mid-June 2015 Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene tabled in parliament the Eskom Appropriation Bill which 
would allow the utility to convert a R60 billion ($5 billion) subordinated loan from government paid between 
2008 and 2011 into equity (ESI-AFrica 5 June, 2015). The rationale for doing so is that it will strengthen the 
utility’s balance sheet (Creamer, 5 June, 2015). 
25  The Amendment Bill (Creamer, 04 June, 2015) will enable the respective appropriation of the R23-billion 
allocated to the power utility.  
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bridge the gap between revenue allocated by Nersa and Eskom’s budget estimates for the next 
five years in the order of R250 billion (FIN24 22 October, 2014). 
In April 2015 Eskom made an application to Nersa for additional tariff increases from the 
country’s consumers for the period 1 April 2015 until 30 June 2018 through a ‘selective tariff 
re-opener’. This sought to receive an additional R16.8 billion per year for three years (R50.4 in 
total) and requested: an additional R32.9 billion to pay for the additional diesel currently capped 
at R1.5 billion per annum; R5.3-billion per year to pay for the short-term power purchase 
programme26 contracts (Yelland, 2015); and a proposed 2.5c/kWh increase in the environmental 
levy. This would raise the tariff increase by a further 12.6% in addition to the 12.7% that was 
approved in April 2015 until April 2018 (Creamer 2 June, 2015). The hikes were opposed by 
business (Creamer 18 June, 2015b) and unions (Fin24 17 June, 2015) alike, as well as civil 
society. Nersa denied the request, arguing that Eskom needed to make a complete application 
for a full tariff re-opener.  
Eskom’s financial crisis is further exacerbated by the costs of Eskom’s Medupi and Kusile 
power plants which have increased significantly since they were announced in 2005. The final 
cost remains unknown for both plants given the uncertainties around delays and Eskom’s cost of 
capital. Medupi is expected to be fully commissioned in 2021 and Kusile only in 2022 (Le 
Cordeur, 2015). As things stand, the costs of both power plants will not compare favourably 
with REIPPPP prices which as demonstrated in Section 7 have fallen substantially throughout 
the four bidding rounds, nor with the anticipated prices of new smaller-scale coal IPPs. The coal 
baseload programme is capped at R0.82/kWh (in April 2014 Rand) (DoE, 2014). Eskom’s 
average tariff for 2015/16 is R0.79c/kWh (Eskom, 2015b: 28), which means that the renewable 
energy projects in the more recent rounds have now either reached or are close to reaching grid 
parity.  
 
                                                      
26  Power purchased from independent power producers in order to meet the generation shortfall.  
